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I. Introduction
Headlines paint a bleak picture of Afghanistan. 
Among a host of seemingly intractable problems, 
the country faces rising insecurity, endemic 
corruption, and a struggling international effort. 
Many see significant cause for concern and little 
reason for hope. Yet as the United States, its NATO 
allies, and its partners in Afghanistan grapple to 
build a foundation for that country’s long-term 
stability, there is potential for positive change within 
an area often neglected in the public discourse: the 
private sector. 
During last year’s review of U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan, the debate centered on the 
merits of a counterterrorism (CT) relative to a 
counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. CT proponents 
emphasized the use of military force to disrupt, 
dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. In contrast, COIN advocates placed greater 
emphasis on political, diplomatic, and economic 
elements of power. Underlying this debate were 
questions surrounding the efficacy and utility of 
nonmilitary levers of U.S. power in Afghanistan.1 
While the relationship between economic 
growth and security is complex, private-sector 
development undoubtedly will be critical to 
the long-term viability of the Afghan state.2 
By capitalizing on opportunities ranging from 
agriculture and mining to manufacturing and 
services, business growth can provide desperately 
needed tax revenue to a country that receives 
more U.S. official development assistance than any 
other country in the world.3 It also can drive job 
creation and income growth for a population that 
is concerned as much about unemployment and 
poverty as security.4 
In the post-Taliban era, efforts to develop 
Afghanistan’s private sector have been inadequate. 
From an extremely low baseline after decades of 
war, Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
has more than tripled in less than a decade. 
Afghanistan also has made progress building critical 
infrastructure, such as road and telecommunication 
networks, and in providing basic services, such as 
health care and education.5 Despite these gains, 
in 2010, the country derived 40 percent of GDP 
from official development assistance, registered 
Case Study: 
Zarang Motorcycles
Before examining the different factors complicating the 
business landscape, it is worth emphasizing a baseline 
research finding that may surprise readers: despite western 
perception of Afghanistan as an economic wasteland, 
our research revealed businesses functioning and even 
thriving, albeit in a highly distorted environment.16 Beyond 
Roshan Telecom and Moby Group—which have powered 
the robust telecommunications and media sectors—and 
other nationally notable companies, regional small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have identified 
entrepreneurial opportunities and created profitable 
firms.17 In Afghanistan, as in other conflict zones, the 
indigenous population responds rationally to economic 
incentives so long as violence remains below a certain 
threshold.
Entrepreneurship does not have to be invented in 
Afghanistan. Even in childhood, Afghan businesswoman 
Hassina Sherjan explained, “Afghan boys are buying here 
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an annual trade deficit of more than $4 billion, 
and ranked at the bottom of the World Bank’s 
Ease of Doing Business index in most categories.6 
All too often, aid dollars have benefitted foreign 
contractors and Afghan elites at the expense of the 
population. 
Disproportionate attention to military and 
political lines of operation relative to economic 
considerations is culpable for this situation.7 
Even within the economic realm, private-sector 
development has been a second-tier priority, 
as direct support for business development has 
represented a very small share of U.S. assistance to 
Afghanistan.8 
In response, critics have challenged the 
international community’s approach to economic 
development in Afghanistan. In turn, they have 
advocated a model that emphasizes private-sector 
growth driven by entrepreneurship. According to 
this line of thinking, entrepreneurship can be an 
engine of growth, jobs, goods, services, and tax 
revenue, while growing “a class of people with a 
vested interest in stability and order.”9 
In order for entrepreneurship to take root in 
Afghanistan and other post-conflict societies, 
proponents emphasize the need for a number of 
fundamental shifts: accepting capitalism even when 
it appears chaotic; encouraging economic activity 
outside of the government’s and international 
community’s control; valuing dynamism in 
development rather than mere stability; involving 
successful entrepreneurs and investors in economic 
planning; and treating economic growth as an 
integral, not secondary, goal of stabilization and 
reconstruction strategy.10 Centralized, heavy-
handed government planning and activity can have 
a greater marginal impact in poor countries than 
in advanced economies, but should not be seen as 
the only or even the best option.11
This work builds on related studies of 
entrepreneurship in the developing world, which 
show that the incidence of entrepreneurship 
is twice as high in emerging markets as in the 
developed world.12 They cite talent migration, 
a pent-up supply of entrepreneurs, and lower 
seed-capital requirements as key drivers of these 
trends. Moreover, they emphasize the role that 
for a low price and selling over there for a higher price.” 
Despite a general lack of formal education, many Afghan 
businessmen are smart and adaptable, an Afghan banker 
in Kabul explained: “They have their entire business in 
their head: accounts receivable, distribution channels; their 
laptop is a tiny notebook in their shirt pocket … they need 
help for things like writing an e-mail to a distributor in 
Germany or writing a proposal—but they have the street 
smarts to get a container through Karachi or distribute 
their product to Kandahar.” Moreover, Afghans often 
imitate businesses after seeing one company become 
successful—which has led, for example, to unusual growth 
in the plastic sandal and beverage sectors.
The Zarang Motorcycle Company, for example, might 
defy typical western expectations of what Afghans—even 
those with nothing beyond a high school education—are 
capable of achieving. Based in Herat, the family initially 
imported motorcycles from China. Observing the good 
market, they decided to begin assembling their own lines 
of three-wheeled “rickshaws” that could be used for 
transport. Lacking the requisite human capital, they sent 
one of the family brothers to China, where he videotaped 
and photographed the assembly process, and subsequently 
returned to teach a select group of mechanics. They 
have grown from fifteen employees in 2005 to 200 
workers in 2010, with branches across the country. They 
spend $30,000 or more on advertising each year, with a 
nuanced marketing strategy that includes local “celebrity” 
promotions, lottery giveaways, promotional calendars 
printed in Dubai, and billboards. Despite the many imitator 
motorcycle assemblers who have sprung up, they focus 
on quality branding and continue to turn a profit. Their 
motorcycles can be seen throughout Afghanistan in such 
places as Herat, Kandahar, and Mazar. They recently 
purchased new land and are building a factory to start 
fabricating their own parts.
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these companies play in generating jobs, income, 
and wealth, creating industries, satisfying domestic 
demand, and opening export markets.13 
To inform the debate about how best to develop 
Afghanistan’s private sector, the authors of this 
report conducted more than 130 interviews with 
businesses and economic stakeholders in the 
Afghan cities of Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Mazar-
e-Sharif and Herat. To better gain perspective 
from the people who matter most—the Afghans 
themselves—we traveled without security and 
maintained no organizational affiliation. Our goal 
was to understand the narratives, challenges, 
and opportunities of Afghan businesses in order 
to inform a more effective strategy to empower 
them. Our study aims to complement quantitative 
business surveys conducted by the World Bank 
and the Center for International Private Enterprise 
(CIPE) with qualitative research.14 Our desire to 
conduct this study stems from our experience as 
combat veterans of Afghanistan and Iraq, where 
we saw firsthand the importance of investing in the 
long-term economic growth and human potential 
of those societies.
We argue that there is tremendous potential 
to nurture a vibrant private sector in Afghanistan. 
In order to realize this potential, the Afghan 
government must address key obstacles to 
business growth, principally security, corruption, 
access to capital, infrastructure, and policies, 
rules, and regulations. Meanwhile, the 
international community must support the Afghan 
government in these efforts while reforming 
several components of its own efforts relating 
to its leadership, human capital, accountability, 
sector prioritization, and time horizons. While 
the substance of this report is broadly echoed in 
our November 2010 policy brief published by the 
Center for a New American Security (CNAS), we 
undertake a more thorough examination here.15
Section II addresses the implications of key 
obstacles to Afghan businesses. Section III 
highlights strategies that Afghan businesses 
implement to adapt to this highly distorted 
environment. Section IV examines five sectors of 
the economy through specific company profiles. 
The final section provides recommendations 
for those attempting to enable private sector 
development in Afghanistan.
It is necessary to establish what this paper will 
not do. Although we interviewed donors and 
officials from the U.S. Agency for International 
CIPE Survey: Percentage of firms  















CIPE and World Bank 
Business Surveys
CIPE’s survey of 738 Afghan businesses in early 2010 asked 
respondents to name the three factors that most adversely 
affected the growth of the Afghan business sector. “The 
top response was lack of security (mentioned by 78 
percent), followed by corruption (53 percent) and lack of 
electricity (44 percent). No other factors were mentioned 
by more than 15 percent of respondents. The following 
answers were in double figures: crime (14 percent), 
red tape (13 percent), access to land (12 percent), and 
failure to apply the law (12 percent). Electricity shortages 
were the top concern in both Jalalabad and Kandahar; 
there were no other major geographic differences. 
Manufacturing companies, for understandable reasons, 
were more concerned about electricity (52 percent) than 
corruption (40 percent). By comparison, construction, 
services, and retail placed more emphasis on corruption.” 
          Based on  
       738 Afghan  
   business 
respondents
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Development (USAID) in every major region of 
the country, we do not provide a comprehensive 
evaluation of international programs. Rather, 
we describe their most salient shortcomings and 
successes as identified by international development 
officers and Afghans themselves. Additionally, 
we draw on extensive work by many before us 
in writing about these issues. It is our hope that 
our recommendations lead to a renewed focus on 
private-sector development in Afghanistan.
II. The Business  
Landscape of Afghanistan
The business environment of Afghanistan is not 
entirely unrecognizable. Problems similar to those 
in other developing countries or conflict zones 
coexist with the unique difficulties of Afghanistan. 
In this section, we frame our research observations 
within the context of five key problems described 
in enterprise surveys by CIPE and World Bank (see 
sidebar). Behind these headline issues—insecurity, 
corruption, infrastructure, access to capital, and 
policy complaints—we hope to provide texture from 
business owners and ground-level development 
officials. In each sub-section, we provide a brief 
overview of each business constraint before delving 
into our research observations. In the final sub-
section, we identify several ways in which the 
international community has hindered its well-
intentioned efforts to address these problems. 
Key Problem: Insecurity
Most media coverage of Afghanistan focuses 
on rising violence, and elevated troop levels and 
activity. 2010 was the deadliest year ever for 
coalition troops, and overall violence was up 
threefold relative to 2007.18 Businesses interviewed 
in the CIPE survey cited “insecurity” as their top 
concern. While the common western interpretation 
is that insecurity renders business impossible, the 
reality is more complex.
Research Observations 
Despite increasing violence, business 
continues. As of fall 2010, levels of violence in 
Afghanistan’s economic centers remained low 
enough that a semblance of normal life went 
on and markets continued to function. Even 
in Kandahar, the country’s most violent city by 
casualty rate, factories and glass office buildings 
remained open, although sparsely. This does not 
discount the possibility that escalating violence 
could result in a situation where civil society 
ceases to function in certain areas. Trend lines are 
not encouraging: the United Nations Assistance 
Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported rising 
Afghan civilian causalities in the first half of 2010, 
despite more stringent U.S. rules of engagement.19 
The August 2010 murder of ten medical workers 
in the Badakhshan Province, one of the safest in 
Afghanistan, was troubling because low-profile aid 
workers were previously rarely targeted. As Taliban 
expert Michael Semple noted, it demonstrated 
the potential rise of “conflict entrepreneurs [who] 
adopt the mantle of government or opposition, 
to prey upon the civilian population or economic 
activity. Whether driven by zealotry or profit, 
fighters can engage in the ultimate anti-social 
activity of massacring health workers, free from 
the restraint of social norms, government law or 
Taliban discipline.”20 
The World Bank’s “Afghanistan Investment Climate in 
2008” Enterprise Survey of 1,066 firms asked respondents 
to rate severe constraints to their businesses. They most 
frequently named: policy enforcement; electricity; crime, 
theft, and disorder; corruption; access to land; and access 
to finance. The top constraint of “policy enforcement” 
was defined as “state ineffectiveness in designing and 
implementing consistent policies.” Beyond the top six, 
other issues included telecommunications, tax rates, 
inadequately educated workforce, regulation (custom, 
trade, labor, licensing, and permits), and the courts. 
Notably, when asked a similar, but differently phrased 
question—to name the single biggest obstacle to their 
particular business—respondents focused on their inability 
to acquire key resources, most often referring to problems 
accessing capital, electricity, and land. 
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However, according to resident U.S. officials 
and Afghans, many western companies and other 
outsiders overestimate security risks and avoid even 
safe areas of the country. The steady diet of media 
reports on violent actions dominates their con-
sciousness. Turkish, Chinese, and Lebanese investors 
have seized business opportunities after doing more 
specific risk assessments of particular regions and 
sectors.21 If westerners travel and act in a low-pro-
file manner, they find that operating in cities such 
as Herat, Kabul, and Mazar can be reasonably safe. 
Sadat Naderi, the chairman of Afghanistan’s 
first insurance company, explained how he had 
been able to lower the average annual property 
premiums he received from underwriter Lloyd’s  
of London from 10 percent to less than 1 percent  
over the last several years: “The small amount 
of claims has shown that market risk is not 
as portrayed.” Covering 34 provinces, Naderi 
mitigates risk by tailoring risk premiums to each 
district in which he operates. 
Insecurity complicates development of 
infrastructure, transportation, and other 
critical areas. Insecurity exacerbates many factors 
vital to economic growth. For instance, in order to 
cope with inadequate human capital, companies 
bring in technical/managerial talent from Pakistan, 
India, and European countries. As the perceived 
security situation worsens, outsiders become 
unwilling or unable to enter Afghanistan. An 
Afghan beverage manufacturer near Kandahar 
found that when complex equipment failed, he 
was unable to bring in foreign technical engineers 
to fix the problem. Roshan Telecom, the largest 
telecommunications company in Afghanistan, has 
found that one out of four westerners it recruits 
drops out due to safety concerns—even though 
the relevant jobs are not dangerous. 
Efforts to improve infrastructure also can be 
derailed by security complaints, sometimes with 
legitimate reason, sometimes not. An American 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) worker 
said, “Sometimes security can be an excuse for 
not doing hard things.” In such an environment, 
it may be too easy to blame unrelated failures on 
security or “incompetent and corrupt” Afghans, 
and too difficult for a Washington-based supervisor 
to question.
Poor infrastructure and security issues make 
transportation costs a significant constraint. Several 
Afghan business people noted that transporting a 
standard shipping container from the United States 
to Karachi (Pakistan) can cost roughly the same 
as it does to move that container from Karachi to 
Kabul. A senior U.S. development official stated 
that the primary impact of conflict is “driving the 
cost of transportation up, cutting business[es] off 
from their raw materials, marketplace, or both.” 
Transportation options are also crowded out: 
“domestic freight is taken up by internationals; 
airfields are monopolized.”
Coalition-affiliated businesses are often  
most impacted by insecurity. Physical security 
is a central challenge for certain businesses. 
Insurgents often target businesses known to  
work with international forces. Security issues 
along major roads, usually bribes paid for passage, 
impair access to raw materials and access to 
markets for businesses, particularly in the South, 
and for rural farmers bringing their goods to 
urban areas. Many high-profile businessmen fear 
kidnapping, so they avoid travel to branch sites and 
remove their families from the country. 
The Taliban’s choice of targets is nuanced. The 
owner of the Herat-based drink manufacturer, 
SuperCola, recounted one of his trucks being 
stopped on the road to Kandahar. Eventually, 
the Taliban hijackers released the truck because 
“they had decided that SuperCola was only sold 
to Afghans, and not to the United Nations or 
military.” Another manufacturer in Kandahar noted 
that his large shipments of bottled water were 
specifically targeted, because the “Taliban said only 
foreigners drink lots of bottled water.”
Insecurity creates rent-seeking opportunities. 
The conflict has forced international actors to allow 
and even encourage warlords who can provide 
protection. In some areas, warlords are seen as a 
“necessary nuisance,” who at least can provide 
reliable help and some degree of order. This, in 
turn, creates an environment where such power 
brokers engage in rent-seeking behavior, making 
money by charging exorbitant fees for access to 
basic resources such as gravel. The most ambitious 
warlords stage attacks in order to prove that their 
security services are necessary.22 
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Uncertainty, rather than physical insecurity, 
is the central problem. Physical insecurity 
exacerbates existing problems and creates new 
challenges. However, it does not determine 
business outcomes in Afghanistan by itself. Even 
in dangerous circumstances, people respond to 
economic incentives in rational ways. Uncertainty, 
which refers not only to physical security but also 
to the lack of predictability concerning the current 
government, foreign involvement, infrastructure, 
policies, regulations, and a host of other factors, is 
the primary challenge for Afghan businesses.
In the CIPE survey of Afghanistan’s business 
climate, Afghans put “insecurity” at the top of their 
constraint lists.23 But in detailed discussions with 
dozens of business owners, this concern was not 
primarily about actual physical and personal security 
for the specific individual or business. Instead, their 
concerns referred to the overall instability that 
fueled an unpredictable environment. Even in 
Kandahar, considered one of the most dangerous 
urban areas of the country, businesses highlighted 
uncertainty about the quality and timing of the 
power supply, about supplies flowing in through 
border crossing at Spin Boldak (between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan), about the local/national 
government, about financing, and about the 
sanctity of obligations should political power shift, 
rather than questions of physical security. 
As in the rest of the world, markets hate 
uncertainty. Over and over again, businessmen 
complained that the tax structure, custom tariffs, 
local power brokers, American force posture and 
policies, and personalities in government were 
in constant flux. Two owners of newly created 
manufacturing companies said they were given 
seven-year tax break guarantees by the minister 
of finance, only to see them rescinded by the next 
minister who replaced him.
Uncertain risks pose greater challenges than 
large well-known obstacles. With a known 
constraint, businesses adapt or hedge by shifting 
operations, becoming more liquid, or buying 
protection. If security is an issue, the business can 
budget for it—the price of security guards or a 
bribe to local actors is simply a “tax” on business. 
As Jahid Mohseni, CEO of Moby Media said, “The 
problem for business is not the variables [security, 
corruption] themselves, but the variability of the 
variables.”
Key Problem: Corruption
Corruption is ubiquitous throughout Afghanistan. 
In the last several years, highly publicized incidents 
have highlighted this issue, including alleged 
fraud in the 2009 presidential elections, the near-
collapse of Kabul Bank on charges of irregularities 
and related party lending, and dubious reversals 
of indictments against corrupt officials.24 A 
United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime study 
published in 2010 reported that Afghan citizens 
viewed public dishonesty as a bigger problem than 
insecurity or unemployment, and found that total 
bribe payments were equivalent to 23 percent of 
Afghanistan’s GDP.25 Moreover, corruption has 
extended beyond requested financial bribes, to 
include favoritism and nepotism in the dispersal of 
aid supplies, locations of infrastructure projects, 
and enforcement of regulations.26 A 2009 Integrity 
Watch Afghanistan survey of 6,500 Afghans found 
that corruption was perceived as simply “a normal 
way of doing business with the state.”27 
“On the radar” businesses—generally bigger 
firms dealing with government contracts—are 
more likely to face corruption problems.28 For 
example, large firms in the World Bank survey 
ranked corruption their fourth-biggest constraint; 
as opposed to small and micro ones, who dropped 
it to sixth. Notably, construction companies ranked 
corruption second only to policy enforcement as 
their biggest concern. 
Over the last year, U.S. policymakers have 
devoted increased attention to corruption 
surrounding international aid dollars in the wake 
of press reports of millions of dollars leaving 
Afghanistan daily and a Congressional report 
detailing the flow of U.S. money to Taliban parties 
via contractors.29 To some degree, this problem is 
understandable—in a conflict environment, there 
will be “casualties” in attempting to efficiently 
allocate and spend financial resources.30 But the 
rapid spending of large sums of money in small 
Afghan districts, without regard to their absorptive 
capacity, makes waste inevitable. Oversight of 
spending is made more difficult by the quick 
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rotations of contracting officers and security 
constraints that often impede field verification. 
In condemning corruption, the international 
community must acknowledge that their own 
practices have contributed to the problem.
Sewing machines at Tarsian & Blinkley, a primary 
manufacturer of Afghan military uniforms, located just 
outside of Kabul. (Jake Cusack)
Research Observations
Weak Afghan institutions and crony capitalism 
hinder entrepreneurship. Weak institutions 
create an environment where only the well 
connected can thrive. Government postings, 
because of their connections, provide access to 
international contracts and opportunities for 
extortion. These positions are seen as potentially 
more lucrative than other business ventures. Some 
Afghans enter government to enable personal 
business ventures, occasionally “buying” certain 
posts. Others simply co-opt officials who can steer 
money to family enterprises tailored to match 
the international donor “flavor of the month.” A 
large portion of the lucrative Host Nation Trucking 
contract happens to go to the defense minister’s 
son; a sudden change in import regulations 
benefits a ministerial official’s brother who already 
has his supplies inside the country.31 
Many businesses in urban areas view the 
government as both weak and malignant. It is not 
strong enough to protect or guarantee private 
property rights, yet it still wields enough power 
to make things very difficult for the disfavored or 
very easy for the connected. In such a landscape, 
Afghans struggle to find powerful personal allies 
before having the confidence to invest in large 
visible businesses. 
In an interview, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, noted 
academic and Afghanistan’s former minister of 
finance, described two possible thought processes 
for the government: a parasitical approach where it 
seeks only to extract revenue and prey on success, 
or conversely, a model where profit is recognized 
as legitimate and economies grow in partnership 
with individuals and firms. “Right now,” he said, 
“the regulatory environment is such that there is 
no certainty as to which of these states actually 
exists.” Other businessmen noted that high-ranking 
government officials closed off lucrative sectors 
through onerous regulations that protected their 
own entry into these markets. 
In an interview in Kandahar, Mahmoud Karzai, a 
prominent businessman and the Afghan president’s 
brother, accused the government and ministers 
of seeing the private sector as a rival. “In some 
ways,” he said, “they are right, because an enabled 
private sector would eliminate the profit from their 
back door deals … they only entered government 
to get contracts.” Such vehement criticism of the 
government is interesting given that many have 
accused Mahmoud of personally benefiting from 
powerful connections himself.32 
International money and practices can fuel 
corruption. Rapid turnover of international 
personnel hinders the institutional memory of 
donor agencies, particularly regarding development 
spending and business contracting. Villains of 
one time period become saviors two years later; 
malicious Afghans are able to run the same 
scams again and again. One Afghan businessman 
complained that contract officers rarely take the 
time to complete due diligence. Attempts to 
consolidate information on contractor performance 
and long-term history have been sporadic and 
disjointed. Security constraints keep contract 
officers from visiting businesses and clients in the 
field, and there is a tendency to favor English-
speaking and/or returnee ‘favorites’ regardless of 
their business acumen. 
As of August 2010, some contracting 
commands had begun to establish a database of 
“good” and “bad” contractors and contracting 
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processes consistent with counterinsurgency 
doctrine. In a similar vein, General Petraeus 
commissioned “Task Force 2010” specifically to 
deal with contractor corruption, and issued new 
guidelines for military contract oversight.33 
Westerners are susceptible to corruption as 
well. Some westerners take advantage of chaotic 
conditions and powerful connections to escape 
accountability, reap windfall profits, and fail to pay 
Afghan subcontractors. This summer, a local Afghan 
contractor in Kandahar never received payment 
from a British contractor and was subsequently 
beheaded by his own creditors.34 Another common 
problem is misrepresentation. For example, 
contractors with access to western bases rebrand 
another business’s brochures as their own, sell a 
service, and take a huge cut as the middleman. 
Not all foreigners working with local businesses 
act in the Afghan’s best interest, and implementing 
partners may be too willing to encourage flawed 
projects in order to preserve their own contracts. 
Mustafa Kazem, head of the Afghan Growth Fund, 
describes one consequence of “free money” and 
funding of projects that lack commercial viability:
“In an effort to promote private sector 
development, on occasion, donors have 
provided grant funding to private businesses 
that lack the management capacity and financial 
resources to operate in a sustainable manner. 
Often times, the grant provider decides what 
sector and type of business it wants to fund, 
writes the business plan, and then seeks an 
Afghan partner to implement the project. The 
success of this approach is limited and short 
term, as most of these businesses can not 
operate effectively beyond the grant or project 
assistance period. Furthermore, this approach 
of offering “free money” to Afghan businesses 
competes with financial services firms that are 
providing long term market appropriate capital.”
Liz Vallette at Peace Dividend Trust noted 
that several savvy international contractors are 
attempting to leverage the US Mission’s Afghan 
First local procurement mandate by making 
themselves “look Afghan,” in order to compete for 
contracts set aside for Afghan-owned companies.35 
In response, PDT dispatches Afghan employees 
to verify that businesses are Afghan-owned and 
operated before adding them to its local supplier 
directory.
Corruption adversely impacts business. 
Corruption is an added cost of doing business 
and barrier to attempted reforms. Beyond large-
scale corruption, Afghan businesses note a micro 
level of government inefficiencies: frequent 
complaints about “intentional nonsense” for 
visa requirements, customs problems, company 
renewal, and the frustration of attempting to get 
any single piece of paperwork through Kabul. One 
businessman noted that every signature required 
for a document is seen as an opportunity by 
government officials to get an “expediting fee.”
In an interview, a high-level Afghan government 
official argued that some corruption is rooted 
in outdated, unclear, or poorly implemented 
regulation. Some laws have been reformed, 
but their translation into specific regulation is 
inconsistent. For example, a USAID development 
officer noted, the law might say that a municipality 
must issue a construction permit—but then the 
municipality might require between one and 100 
steps to get the permit. Businesses lack a clear 
sense of their rights and obligations in relation to 
the government. 
Because 85 percent of the Afghan economy 
is informal, the government hopes to widen its 
tax base.36 But informal businesses (unlicensed/
untaxed), one senior Afghan official explained, are 
afraid to show up in the system. The government 
fails to incentivize Afghan businesses to join 
formal economy. It can take six months to clear 
taxes in some cases. Moreover, being in the 
formal economy does not ease barriers to credit. 
According to Suleman Fatimie, CEO of the Harakat: 
“The security will heal; corruption is the major 
problem. So many companies are operating below 
the radar, public power is seen to be used for their 
own benefit.”37 
Drug trade reinforces corruption. The Afghan 
drug trade is closely intertwined with corruption. 
Opium production is a large component of 
Afghanistan’s GDP and central to the economy of 
several provinces, particularly in the South. Some 
of the deposit growth in Kabul banks is allegedly 
fueled by laundering of drug money. While 
examining the drug trade is outside of the scope of 
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a paper on sustainable business, a relevant sidenote 
is that much of the appeal of poppy to farmers 
might be process rather than price.
As Navy Lieutenant Tim Graczewski, military 
advisor for economic development in the South, 
noted: “It is a Dell model. There is allure to farmers 
in having something that can be distilled to a 
portable product and picked up at your front gate 
for hard cash.” To get other licit crops to market, 
such as pomegranates, substantial infrastructure 
still must be developed. Goods have to be 
transported over unsecure or inadequate roads 
(requiring bribes), stored in generally nonexistent 
cold storage facilities, and eventually delivered for 
an uncertain price to markets that may be too far 
away to make delivery practical.
Key Problem: Access to Capital
The banking sector has experienced strong growth 
since 2001, with seventeen commercial banks in 
Afghanistan holding $2.6 billion in assets as of 
2010.38 However, only 3 percent of Afghan 
individuals have bank accounts, and an estimated 
$3 billion of Afghanistan residents’ wealth remains 
outside the banking system.39 Deposits also greatly 
exceed loans, with a loan-to-deposit ratio below 
50 percent. The banking system as a whole has 
not inspired confidence—most recently, Kabul 
Bank, the largest Afghan bank which held one-third 
of all Afghanistan deposits, almost exhausted its 
liquidity when reports of irregularities and fraud 
triggered a run.40 
Insufficient access to capital is a common 
complaint of Afghan businesses. In the World 
Bank Enterprise Survey, business owners note this 
as the single biggest constraint to their own firm.41 
The CIPE survey found that only 6 percent of 
businesses had received bank loans, instead relying 
on business profits or loans from friends to finance 
their business. The World Bank ranks Afghanistan 
127th of 183 countries for obtaining credit, and 
dead last for protecting investors. Access to capital 
is worse outside of Kabul: unpublished donor 
studies viewed by the authors pointed to minimal 
lending to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
beyond the capital region.
Research Observations
The average business owner has limited 
options to access capital. In our interviews, small 
firms to large multisector conglomerates identified 
access to capital as a major constraint to growth. 
A “missing middle” exists in credit markets: 
microcredit up to $2,000, and large-scale funding 
for infrastructure projects is available, but there is 
little in between. Bank owners often use funds as 
lines of credit for personal businesses—credit is 
not available to average firms.42 A well-connected 
businessman’s personal relationships with the 
management of a bank can help him win loans 
up to $100 million with few strings attached.43 
The rescue of Kabul Bank from near collapse by 
powerful government allies is symptomatic of 
a poorly regulated banking sector that lends to 
related parties.44 
Applications for loans often are of poor 
quality. Deeper problems belie access to capital for 
Afghan businesses. Mustafa Kazem, who manages 
the $55 million Afghan Growth Fund that invests 
in Afghan businesses, explained that he received 
many applications that lack necessary information 
and do not include adequate business planning, 
“We have to provide significant pre-investment 
support to applicants. We spend a lot of time 
helping the client update its business plan, draft 
financial statements and projections, and perform 
feasibility analysis.”
Afghan businesses’ lack of audited financial 
statements and inability put a business plan on 
paper are major problems. Khalil Sediq, head of 
the Afghanistan International Bank, described 
how it could take forty days to approve or deny a 
small loan because the owners could not provide 
documentation and had to be walked through 
each step. In other cases, owners are reluctant 
to share information because they are afraid 
financials will leak to either competitors or the 
government and lead to more taxes. They worry, 
with good reason, that if outsiders learn that they 
are making a profit, criminals may kidnap family 
members for ransom; the government may try to 
extract additional revenue; donors may withdraw 
support; or family members may try to launch a 
copycat business. Mr. Sediq noted that because of 
the paucity of information, banks conduct “ancient 
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trust-type banking in a western model bank,” 
seeking out other colleagues to provide reputation 
recommendations.
Collateral and dispute resolution mechanisms 
are lacking. Other systematic problems impair 
access to credit. Less than half of land is legally 
registered and is not trusted as collateral.45 In Herat 
Industrial Park, businesses have been in place for 
over three years without acquiring an official deed 
to be used for credit.46 Credit scores do not exist. 
Attempts to provide credit or collateral registries are 
in their infancy and do not provide assurances that 
a borrower has not already taken out multiple loans. 
Afghanistan ranks dead last in the world for 
“protecting investors” and “closing a business” 
in the World Bank’s 2009 Doing Business report. 
Businessmen consider the judiciary to be “corrupt 
to the core,” and have no faith that their interests 
will be protected if a contract is not honored or a 
business collapses. The head of one major bank noted 
that debtors will simply pay small bribes to relevant 
judges in order to stall attempts to collect collateral. 
Islamic beliefs impact financial practices. 
Conservative Afghan businessmen in rural regions 
and even more progressive “western” Muslim 
investors in Afghanistan stressed the importance 
of Islamic principles against interest and instead 
emphasized respect for the Islamic musharaka, 
mudaraba, and ijara (venture capital, partnership, 
and leasing models). However, some Afghan 
businessmen interviewed argued that this aversion 
to interest-bearing loans stemmed from common 
25 percent interest rates and 200 percent collateral 
requirements rather than from religious principles. 
Key Problem: Infrastructure  
and Human Capital
In some respects, industrial infrastructure in 
Afghanistan has improved dramatically in the past 
decade. Thousands of miles of new roads connect 
Afghan commercial centers; several private airlines 
fly between Afghan cities, neighboring countries, 
the Persian Gulf, and Europe; and an estimated 
12 million Afghan have mobile telephone 
subscriptions. However, major challenges persist. 
While total electricity capacity has increased 
fourfold since 2002, still only 15 percent of 
households in urban areas and 6 percent of those 
in rural areas have access to electricity. Only an 
estimated 23 percent of Afghans have access to 
safe drinking water and 12 percent to adequate 
sanitation.47 
However, the Afghan business community’s 
perception of the country’s industrial infrastructure 
remains low. Based on CIPE’s business survey, 23 
percent of businesses were dissatisfied with local 
roads and 14 percent said there were no roads 
in their area. Twenty-three percent of businesses 
were dissatisfied with local electricity and 43 
percent said there was no electricity in their area. 
Four percent of businesses were dissatisfied with 
local water supply and 72 percent said there was 
no water supply in their area.48 
Window frame manufacturer in Mazar-e-Sharif.  
(Erik Malmstrom)
Insufficient supply and high cost of electricity 
constrain manufacturing. Based on our 
interviews, Afghan industrialists cited the supply 
and cost of electricity as a top concern. Outside 
of Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Heart, the lack of 
reliable electricity makes many power-intensive 
ventures prohibitive. A Nangarhar businessman 
explained his predicament: “I use fourteen hours 
of power per day, three hours of electricity at six 
Afghani (approximately $0.13) per hour and eleven 
hours of diesel generators at forty-five Afghani 
(approximately $1) per hour.” Running diesel-
powered generators was as much as five to ten 
times more costly than grid electricity, constraining 
growth and eroding profit margins. 
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Transportation networks are deficient. 
Poor road networks reduced the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the Afghan businesses interviewed. 
In remote and rugged regions, agricultural and 
mining enterprises were particularly hard-hit. One 
farmer explained that poor roads did not just 
impair his access to markets—roads were so bumpy 
that traveling on them destroyed the quality of 
his agricultural goods. Poor road networks also 
caused the country to miss opportunities to develop 
domestic trade linkages. Border economies were 
more oriented on neighboring countries than on 
neighboring provinces. The international focus of 
major transportation projects sometimes reinforced 
these disparities. For example, rail initiatives 
between Herat and Iran and Mazar-e-Sharif and 
Uzbekistan have taken precedence over domestic 
rail projects. The limited interconnectedness of 
Afghanistan’s domestic market and its consequences 
for the country’s development has alarmed the U.S. 
Department of Defense’s Task Force for Business and 
Stability Operations (TFBSO).49 
Human capital is underdeveloped. Afghan 
businessmen identified the lack of local skilled labor 
as a major constraint. Dr. Mohammad Jalil Shams, 
Director of the National Electricity Authority, noted, 
“We are not Germany after World War II—with 
an educated class who is ready when the capital 
comes.” Only 26 percent of the population is 
literate.50 An Afghan banker added, “It’s going to 
get worse before it gets better.” He explained that 
the current “elite” class was generally educated 
before the Russian invasion and subsequent wars; 
since then there has been a twenty-year gap in 
Afghan education. Many businessmen complained 
of the insufficient supply of architects, engineers, 
managers, plumbers, and electricians. Frequently, 
those remaining in Afghanistan work high-paying 
jobs for international companies and donors, not 
for Afghan companies. 
Similarly, we found that a lack of education and 
experience limits some Afghan entrepreneurs who 
cannot grow their business beyond what they 
contain in their head or a simple notebook. 
Moreover, some are reluctant to hire administrative 
staff or delegate significant responsibility outside 
their family. 
Key Problem: Policies, Rules,  
and Regulations
The Afghan National Development Strategy 
(ANDS), the country’s private-sector blueprint, 
consists of three main components:
1.   Strengthening the enabling environment 
Key items include providing a stable 
macroeconomic environment and supportive 
financial system; attracting private 
investment; enacting and implementing 
commercial legislation to encourage private-
sector involvement in social and economic 
development; ensuring that ministries and 
agencies are able to competently administer 
commercial laws and regulations in an 
unbiased and predictable manner; continuing 
privatization and corporatization of state-owned 
enterprises; improving private-sector access to 
finance; maintaining a pro-trade environment; 
providing firm-level technical assistance; and 
introducing trade facilitation measures to reduce 
the cost of moving goods
2.   Expanding opportunities for private 
investment in infrastructure and natural 
resources development 
Key items include establishing a multisector 
regulatory authority; developing opportunities 
for public-private partnerships in infrastructure 
projects; encouraging private provision of public 
services; and developing and promoting private 
investment opportunities through a concerted 
effort by the entire government.
3.   Concerted private-sector investment 
promotion 
Key items include promoting investment from 
domestic and foreign sources, including Afghan 
diaspora; making the Afghanistan Investment 
Support Agency (AISA) a central player in this 
process; making the responsibility for promoting 
increased investment a government-wide task 
and an integral part of all projects and programs 
undertaken as part of the ANDS; and educating 
potential investors on the opportunities 
available in Afghanistan, assuring them that the 
Afghan government recognizes the importance 
of increased private investment and that their 
investments will not fail due to unpredictable 
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and unfavorable changes in the tax environment 
or policies toward private investors.51 
Despite this ANDS framework, Afghan 
businesses believe that many government policies 
impede growth. When Afghan businesses were 
asked to name three issues that should be among 
the government’s highest priorities in order to 
promote economic growth and a strong private 
sector in the CIPE business survey, top responses 
included policy items such as reform of customs 
procedures and duties (59 percent), reducing unfair 
competition due to government officials giving 
preferential treatment to relatives (57 percent), 
facilitation in issuance of business and trade visas 
(42 percent), finding conducive transit routes to 
increase imports and exports (36 percent), reducing 
unfair competition from the informal sector (32 
percent), providing accessible credit with reasonable 
interest rates (27 percent), and simplifying 
burdensome government regulations (24 percent).52 
These results indicate that the Afghan 
government has a long way to go in realizing the 
goals set forth in the ANDS, as some elements 
within the business community view the country’s 
commercial policy as cumbersome, unevenly 
applied, and harmful.
Trade and land policies are unfavorable. 
Our interviews revealed nearly universal business 
concern about Afghanistan’s trade policies, 
rules, and regulations. Traders complained of 
inefficiencies and corruption moving goods in and 
out of the country. Industrialists complained of high 
tariffs on raw materials and dumping by Pakistani, 
Iranian, and Central Asian companies.53 In several 
regions, locals recounted stories of Pakistani 
or Iranian buyers collecting perishable produce 
during the harvest, moving it to cold storage in 
their own country, and then selling it back into 
Afghanistan during the winter. In the carpet and 
marble industries, Pakistani producers procure 
raw materials from Afghanistan and capture value 
by finishing and processing themselves. Across 
the board, outside actors have incentives to keep 
Afghan businesses from expanding into profitable 
areas of the value chain. Such examples are 
widely noted by entrepreneurs, and exacerbate 
the difficulties that new entrepreneurs, including 
women, face in entering even their local markets.54 
Additionally, Afghan businesses expressed 
deep concern about the country’s land policies. 
Though private ownership of land is not recognized 
without an officially registered deed, most land is 
unregistered or held under informal agreements, 
allowing the Afghan government to claim over 
90 percent of the country’s land.55 A senior AISA 
official commented, “No land is available. If it 
available, it is inaccessible. There is no clear land 
policy. Most Afghans have no idea what it is.”
Complicated public-private relationships 
compromise policies. Certain dynamics in the 
public-private relationship compromise policy-
making and implementation. In some cases, 
incestuous relations between Afghan government 
officials and big business render the two parties 
indistinguishable. Powerful businessmen purchase 
positions in government, which they use to steer 
funding, contracts, and resources to personal 
business interests. In other cases, government 
officials perceive the private sector as a competitive 
threat to their power base. Finally, businesses 
without powerful allies in the government resent 
favoritism given to friends of the government, 




The negative effects of international actions 
are neglected in many western evaluations of 
Afghanistan’s business climate. Several factors—
short-term time horizons, poorly monitored 
spending, and reliance on interlocutors—can 
make well-intentioned donor interventions 
counterproductive. International actors must be 
mindful of their own structures and methodologies. 
This section diagnoses such unforeseen second-
order effects, while recommendations for changing 
international coordination, prioritization, and 
programs are outlined in Section V.
Western policies and actions have short time 
horizons … The unpredictability of the business 
environment is exacerbated by the shortsightedness 
of international actors. The epithet of the 
U.S. military fighting “nine one-year wars” in 
Afghanistan applies equally to U.S. development 
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efforts. Aid officials give promises and build 
relationships, but then rotate out six months 
later—leaving the client businesses to renavigate 
the western bureaucracy. 
Employment contracts can be as short as three 
months, hardly sufficient time to learn a new 
position. Afghan-American entrepreneur Sanzar 
Kakar noted: “Each new advisor starts from scratch 
and tries to do an assessment or a strategy with 
or without realizing that the same thing has been 
done eight years in a row. So now, we are exactly 
where we were back when advisors first started—
actually worse because we wasted all that time 
and money.” These problems make continuity 
nearly impossible when dealing with donor-funded 
contracts.
Donor priorities can also shift, leaving projects 
orphaned and without follow-up. In the summer 
of 2010, several American development officials 
made it clear that they were spending with a 
close eye to maximize impact before the July 2011 
deadline. Others spoke of needing to expend 
budget dollars before the next fiscal year with little 
consideration for efficacy and impact.
USAID in Afghanistan relies heavily on 
contracted implementing partners, who operate on 
quarterly reporting schedules.56 These contractors 
often are talented and motivated, but lack 
incentives to implement projects with results that 
may not be seen for three or four years, long 
after their contract performance will have been 
reviewed and re-competed. Military or economic 
development officers may hesitate to lay a 
foundation for a three-year investment when they 
are leaving in six months and their replacement is 
uncertain.
… and exacerbate Afghans’ short-term 
mentality. In such a climate, many Afghans 
focus on short-term opportunistic profits and 
exit strategies to leave the country if and when 
the situation changes for the worse. There is 
little consideration for secondary effects of each 
deal: a raisin producer will mix in bad-quality 
raisins or add dirt into a shipment to Moscow in 
order to boost their product’s weight and fetch a 
higher price—without thought for how this will 
affect his reputation the next time he tries to sell. 
One development official explained: “There is 
One Country: Many Different 
Business Environments
Security, governance, infrastructure, education 
levels, and ethnic composition differ vastly 
across Afghanistan. The capital city of Kabul is 
disproportionately shaped by both the Afghan 
government and international actors, with the 
accompanying inflated prices and malignant 
rent-seekers. It also has many advantages 
for businesses—an airport with over a dozen 
international fights each day, many banks, and 
access to power brokers. In Herat, the culture, 
dress, and education are all heavily influenced 
by Iran. Access to reliable electricity, strong 
governors, and relative security have allowed the 
formation of many industrial enterprises without 
much coalition help. In Kandahar, heavy conflict 
and poor security on roads complicate realizing 
the potential of the large agricultural sector. 
Jalalabad’s location on the main transit route 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan, not far from 
Afghanistan’s main customs point of entry at 
Torkham Gate, creates a vibrant trading economy, 
which also is heavily influenced by agriculture, 
construction, and a heavy international footprint. 
Similarly, Mazar’s proximity to Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan creates a strong trading economy with 
Central Asia. Meanwhile its relative stability 
has led to what many consider the strongest 
business environment in Afghanistan, home to 
the country’s carpet and dried fruits and nuts 
industries.
Ultimately, economic growth initiatives must be 
calibrated to each region. As Afghan businessman 
Tamim Samee explained, “The central planners 
sometimes think of the country as a single 
fabric … but some parts of the country see access 
to land or water as their top issue, while another 
part may see access to finance as a first priority.”
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little orientation towards the client or customer 
service—instead, [there is a history] of performing 
badly and then finding new targets. They often 
market/sell first and produce later.”
Even for business owners with a long-term 
orientation, the constant policy debates in the 
West inform and complicate their business calculus. 
Several small indigenous firms explicitly referred 
to waiting for the July 2011 deadline before 
making any major investment decisions. Other 
businessmen—the ones continuing to plow back 
profits into new business—said in private they had 
already reached a conclusion: Americans would 
be here in force for a long time to come. On this 
assumption they staked their bets for businesses 
that might take three or four years to break even, 
while they still longed for specific guarantees. 
The Economy is “Donor Drunk.” Afghans rapidly 
adapt to the perceived priorities of international 
donors.57 In some cases, this distortion can be 
beneficial, for example creating markets and 
opportunities for women-owned enterprises 
that would not otherwise exist. But in many 
instances, new incentives have emerged that are 
far from what either Afghans or the internationals 
community would have intended.
The heavy influx of international dollars has 
negative consequences.58 Kabul real estate 
prices rival Manhattan. Inflated by hundreds of 
internationals competing for housing, an average 
six-bedroom residence might rent for $8,000/
month. The influx of money has inflated labor 
rates, rendering donor ideas that Afghans might 
compete in large-scale production of exported 
textiles difficult. 
One education program manager explained 
that Afghans are willing to pay to learn English 
and information technology (IT) skills, but never for 
agriculture-related or accounting training. And for 
good reason: English and IT abilities can land a job 
at an NGO or international donor paying $2,500/
month, as opposed to $200/month for an entry-
level professional job at an Afghan firm in Kabul. 
One Afghan government ministerial official further 
complained that young Afghan professionals have 
no loyalty, because they are focused on simply 
making money and actually proud that they change 
jobs every six months. In a captive market with a 
small supply of semiskilled labor, even established 
multinational companies, paying between $350 
and $2,000/month, frequently find their local 
talent siphoned off by embassies and NGOs. Actual 
government employees earn as little as $100/
month while Afghan government “consultants” 
can earn twenty times this amount, and western 
consultants even more—all while working in the 
same building.59 One development official put it 
bluntly: “Only untalented Afghans go to Afghan 
companies; the talented ones are all hired by the 
internationals.”
Some argue that easy donor dollars creates 
a “lack of paying culture” and engenders 
dependence. “You know the best way to get a free 
laptop?” one longtime Kabul expatriate explained, 
“Start an NGO.” She went on to describe 
how some local Afghans had asked for literacy 
training—but then lost interest when they found 
out they would not receive a salary for attending 
classes. A successful Afghan-English businessman 
added, “We appreciate donations, but the sooner 
you become self-sufficient, the better. Look at 
Africa, how they are stuck on aid. You beg once, 
you beg forever.” Such strong statements by 
business owners are common, though the rhetoric 
is sometimes motivated by the desire to secure 
donor capital for their own for-profit plans. 
Afghan Interlocutors and the Bagram 
Millionaires Club. As worsening security 
constrains the travel of western donors and forces 
them to make point-to-point journeys from high-
security compounds to other secured locations, 
they become more dependent on the select go-
betweens who can navigate both military bases 
and Afghan culture. After nine years, one Afghan 
investor explained, there are a “group of Afghans 
who have gotten very good at the system: wearing 
the suit, speaking English, knowing who to talk 
to at embassies, and looking for the short-term 
gain.” After clearing the initial hurdles, becoming 
a contract recipient for construction, security, 
transportation, or services to the internationals 
can be hugely lucrative. One Afghan USAID 
implementing contractor told the story of his 
cousin who parlayed a low-level translation job into 
a contracting business that earned $50 million over 
three years. The cousin had since moved to Dubai. 
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In bridging the gap between two worlds, the 
“hyphens” are vital—Afghan-Americans, Afghan-
Australians, Afghan-Germans, Afghan-English—
who were educated in the West but now have 
returned. Some of the most successful businessmen 
in Afghanistan come from the diaspora—such as 
the Afghan-Australian Mohseni family, which runs 
the well-respected Moby Media Group. However, 
some diaspora Afghans exploit seams between 
the international community and local business 
community to collect exorbitant returns on basic 
construction or transportation projects. 
The closed circuit of international contracting 
creates monopolies. The “Bagram Millionaires 
Club” is a colloquialism in Kabul referring to the 
Afghans who have carved out niches in military 
contracting.60 On Kandahar Air Field, Afghans 
cannot see tendered contracts without being on 
base, but they cannot get on base unless they 
have won a contract. In this Catch-22, the forty 
or so Afghan contractors who have base access 
are highly favored—though even they often still 
lose out to the international firms. The brother of 
Nangarhar Provincial Governor Gul Agha Shirzai, 
a military commander adjacent to Kandahar 
Air Field, runs many lucrative businesses and is 
alleged to charge a fee to any Afghan contractor 
accessing the base. In the absence of transparent 
competition, contractor-on-contractor violence 
occurs.61 
Such issues of access are crucial barriers to 
programs such as Afghan First, which encourages 
procurement from local sources. An entire 
nonprofit organization—Peace Dividend Trust—has 
sprung up to bridge the vast gap between western 
procurement and Afghan contracts. Despite their 
laudable efforts, including facilitation of over $400 
million in purchases, only a fraction of possible 
procurement happens locally. The launch of 
AfghanFirst.org is a step toward improving access 
to request for proposals and providing information 
on bidding procedures. 
III. Business Adaptation 
A brief theoretical overview assists in understanding 
firm behavior in Afghanistan. In equilibrium, the firm 
creates and manages markets and organizations.62 It 
increases economic value of transactions in a way 
that consumers could not realize through direct 
exchange and consumer organizations.63 An 
entrepreneur is a consumer who expects that 
establishing a firm will improve economic efficiency 
relative to competing entrepreneurs, consumer 
organizations, and established firms.64 In most cases, 
successful market entry by the entrepreneur requires 
innovations in business transactions, methods, 
technologies, and products.65 
The Afghan business environment represents 
disequilibrium. Markets are imperfect. High-
margin sectors such as energy, construction, and 
trade display characteristics of monopolies and 
oligopolies in which one or a few firms have 
enough control over a product or service to 
have a significant impact over the terms which 
other individuals have access to it. These firms 
maintain market power through economic, legal, 
and deliberate barriers to entry including price 
manipulation, patron-client relationships, and 
vertical integration. 
In contrast, low-margin sectors such as 
agriculture and retail display characteristics of 
fragmentation. Few firms have significant market 
share to strongly influence industry outcomes. 
This fragmentation arises from low entry barriers, 
lack of economies of scale, and gaps in the 
value chain.66 Additionally, insecurity, corruption, 
poor infrastructure, and lack of access to capital 
complicate the ability of businesses to overcome 
fragmentation.
Unsurprisingly, the Afghan business environment 
does not support entrepreneurial innovation in 
the same way that a developed economy does. 
Disequilibrium can deter, rather than encourage, 
the consumer to become an entrepreneur and 
establish a firm. When the consumer identifies 
a business opportunity, obstacles can be 
insurmountable: anticompetitive behavior of 
established firms may prevent market entry; gaps in 
the value chain may limit or negate the innovation’s 
economic value; and the consumer’s inability to 
access capital, markets, and inputs may inhibit the 
consumer from acting on the opportunity. 
In response, Afghan businesses employed 
a number of common strategies to cope with 
disequilibrium and uncertainty. 
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Vertical Integration
We observed Afghan businesses integrating 
vertically, often within familial and tribal ranks, 
to minimize reliance on untrustworthy business 
partners and the government. The Mazar-e-Sharif−
based Barakat Group is illustrative of many import-
export conglomerates dominant in the Afghan 
business environment. Founded as a family-run 
trading company in 1972, it operates throughout 
Afghanistan with 200 local staff and estimated 
revenues of $100 million in 2009. It has subsidiaries 
in trade (agricultural machinery, automobiles, 
foodstuffs, LPG and petroleum products, steel 
products, furniture), production (bleached cotton, 
PVC windows and doors, greenhouse), and 
construction. It has investment stakes in Afghan 
Petroleum and Gas, Sungas, Sunpetrol, and a 
fruit processing facility. It also operates in Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, 
and Uzbekistan. Explaining his desire for vertical 
integration, the group’s general manager stated, 
“We have the most corrupt government and 
people in the world. I don’t like relying on people 
outside of my family if I don’t have to.”
A logical progression guides Afghan firm 
formation and growth. The process of vertical 
integration begins around a central business, often 
import-export, and grows to include supporting 
businesses, such as transportation and logistics. 
It then can grow to include other sectors such as 
construction, agriculture, and light manufacturing. 
The experience of the Jalalabad-based Zalmay 
Afghan Group is instructive. In 1996, a friend 
of company president, Haji Zalmay Stanakzai, 
encouraged him to start a construction company, 
offered him an office, and provided seed capital. 
Stanakzai started the company with $25,000, two 
cargo trucks, and a Toyota Corolla. Explaining why 
he began in construction, he said, “Construction 
has the highest margins.” Over time, his company’s 
portfolio grew to include roads, bridges, clinics, 
retaining walls, and schools, contracted primarily 
through international organizations and military 
forces. 
Growth was slow initially, but rapidly increased 
as the company strengthened its industry 
reputation and relationships with contractors 
and suppliers. Stanakzai reinvested profits into 
the company, did not take out any loans, and 
received no donor grants. He created a trading 
subsidiary in order to secure cheaper, more 
reliable access to materials for his construction 
projects. Subsequently, he formed a transportation 
subsidiary to cut out the expensive middlemen that 
he had been employing to transport construction 
materials from Pakistan to Afghanistan. Last year, 
the Zalmay Afghan Group reported $650,000 in 
revenue and increased its staff to 230 employees. 
In the next year, Stanakzai hoped to find a foreign 
partner and expand his business to Pakistan and 
India. However, he voiced concerns, “Security is 
worsening and donors are less willing to invest …
but if ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] 
leaves, I will shift my focus to trading.”
Trading Versus Producing
Businesses attempted to remain as flexible as 
possible to hedge against uncertainty, valuing 
short-term but dependable gains over developing 
long-term capacities. A western official 
commented, “Afghans go to the highest margin 
businesses that require the least amount of capital 
and that produce benefits in the least amount of 
time. This means that they start in trade, then pick 
off productive opportunities in services, agriculture, 
and construction. Even then, people are loath to 
invest in manufacturing relative to trade because it 
is easier and quicker.” 
Major challenges confront productive enterprises 
in Afghanistan, including: 
•  Limited access to capital constrains investment in 
land, equipment, labor, and other start-up costs. 
•  Companies have access to a few hours of state-
provided electricity daily, then rely on diesel-
powered generators at a significantly higher 
price. 
•  Damage to Afghanistan’s productive capacities 
has disproportionately affected producers 
relative to traders who capitalize on industrial 
infrastructure in Pakistan, Iran, and other 
neighboring countries. 
•  Foreign companies maintain a strong foothold 
in the Afghan market, are better able to capture 
economies of scale than Afghan producers, and 
18 B a c t r i a n  G o l d :  C h a l l e n g e s  a n d  H o p e  f o r  P r i v a t e - S e c t o r  D e v e l o p m e n t  i n  A f g h a n i s t a n
B u s i n e s s  A d a p t a t i o n
benefit numerous stakeholders in the Afghan 
trading economy. 
•  Afghanistan’s trade policies, which tax raw 
materials at a higher rate than finished good 
imports, increase producer operating costs, and 
favor traders and foreign competitors. 
•  Insufficient industrial infrastructure causes  
value to be added to Afghan products outside 
the country. 
Liquidity, diversification, and flexibility help 
powerful traders manage Afghanistan’s uncertain 
business environment. Additionally, these traders 
have mutually beneficial relationships with political 
and military power brokers: traders provide power 
brokers a “means of investment, potential for 
money laundering, and strengthening of influence 
by linking military, economic, and political power”; 
power brokers provide traders “security, tax 
exemption and credit, lucrative contracts,” and 
access to critical production inputs such as land and 
water.67 In contrast, small producers and traders 
have more limited access to markets, are trapped in 
negative relationships with middlemen, and make 
negligible margins.68 
An Afghan official working for a USAID 
implementing partner commented, “It is impossible 
for Afghans to establish businesses. There are 
no protections for industrialists. There are no 
incentives except for importer tycoons who run 
our economy. They have friends in government, 
parliament, and the ministries. They play by a 
separate set of rules … they have relationships with 
the government and with each other. While other 
traders pay 15 percent import tariffs, they pay 4 
percent.” 
Engineer Ghulam Hasan, owner of the 
Jalalabad-based Riaz Packages Company and 
Director of the 93-member Nangarhar Industrial 
Association described the challenges for small-scale 
Afghan industrialists. “My association has eight 
sections: plastics, non-alcoholic beverages, ice, 
carpets, soaps, textiles, foodstuffs, and technical 
products such as bicycles. Ten percent of these 
companies are doing well and 90 percent are 
not. Power (electricity) is a problem for everyone. 
The government does not support us. It procures 
products from Pakistan and China. It places high 
taxes on raw materials and low taxes on end 
products. It has no strategy for factories.” 
He continued, “Pakistani competitors undercut 
us all. They wage price wars against us. When 
Afghans starting producing cement, Pakistani 
companies dropped the price from 150 rupees to 
120 rupees for 50 kilograms. After they put the 
Afghan companies out of business, they raised 
the price to 320 rupees. They dump their products 
here. Their government subsidizes exports from 10 
percent to 50 percent...Afghanistan has no strategy 
to deal with this.”
Relations with External Actors
Government
Firms exhibited wide variations in their perceptions 
of subnational governmental bodies, which were 
heavily influenced by their opinion of the provincial 
governor. In Balkh Province, many businesses 
praised the long-serving governor and former 
warlord, General Atta Mohammed Noor. They 
attributed the province’s relative stability and 
strong business environment to his leadership while 
acknowledging corruption within his government. 
Syed Tahir Roshanzada, director of the Balkh 
Province Chamber of Commerce (ACCI) stated, “In 
Balkh, the governor supports the private sector. He 
is a problem solver. But, the central government is 
bad. It is not implementing its promises and it is not 
helping.” A western official explained, “Because 
Balkh has remained safe under Atta, it is a magnet 
for FDI. He gets his take, but he also reinvests in 
infrastructure and municipal development.”
In contrast, Nangarhar Governor Gul Agha 
Shirzai, also a former warlord with significant 
personal business interests, elicited more negative 
reactions. While some businesses credited him 
with stabilizing Nangarhar at the beginning of 
his tenure in the mid-2000’s, others blamed him 
for the province’s deteriorating security. They 
also complained about the negative effect of 
his government’s corruption on their business 
activities. An Afghan businessman complained 
that the provincial government and police were 
stealing revenue from the Torkham Gate border 
crossing, from a donor-financed reconstruction 
fund, and from informal checkpoints along the 
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Torkham Gate to Jalalabad road. He stated that 
Shirzai, who owned a construction company, 
had intimidated competitors when bidding for 
Provincial Reconstruction Team contracts and 
threatened donors who attempted to monitor his 
company’s work. 
Those holding a positive opinion of the local 
government, such as those in northern Afghanistan, 
were more likely to rely on the government for 
security, arbitrating disputes, and providing basic 
services. In contrast, those holding a negative 
opinion of local government, such as those in 
southern and eastern Afghanistan, attempted to 
distance themselves from it as much as possible.
Business strategies for coping with government 
also varied based on the size and nature of the 
business. Large-scale traders were most likely to 
have a favorable impression of the government 
and be inclined to cooperate with it. In contrast, 
small-scale traders and producers were most 
likely to have an unfavorable impression of local 
government and were highly critical of it for 
failing to provide public services in an honest and 
accountable manner. 
Most businesses viewed government relations 
as an added cost of operations. They were often 
disappointed with the level of services provided 
by the government, but saw bribes as a way of 
deterring the government from meddling in their 
affairs. Many businesses were resentful of paying 
these costs at multiple levels, ranging from high-
level government officials to low-level police and 
customs officials. An Afghan trader and former 
director of a regional trade association commented, 
“The current situation makes you pay everyone, the 
Taliban, the government, the police. These costs 
are 30 percent of my budget. Everything is corrupt, 
it is our culture.” 
Insurgents 
Business opinions of insurgent groups varied 
widely. In the more volatile eastern and southern 
regions, businesses exhibited a higher risk threshold 
than those in the western and northern regions. 
They were more accustomed to threats posed by 
insurgents because they had dealt with these risks 
for much of the post-Taliban era. In the northern 
and western regions, businesses were concerned 
about rising insecurity and uncertain regarding how 
they would handle these risks. In Mazar-e-Sharif, 
businesses anxiously watched the experience of 
Kunduz and Baghlan provinces, which had fallen 
under Taliban control in recent years. They were 
worried that insecurity was spreading and creeping 
closer to Mazar-e-Sharif proper, the commercial 
hub of northern Afghanistan. 
Businesses had four primary options for 
managing physical insecurity: 1) shifting 
operations geographically; 2) allocating up to 
20 percent of an operating budget to formal 
security costs, including a security director, 
guards, etc.; 3) negotiating with government 
or insurgent power brokers through payment 
of informal taxes; and 4) negotiating with local 
communities to increase their sense of ownership 
in the business’ operations in return for their 
protection of the business’ interests.
Two construction companies illustrate differing 
risk thresholds of business owners. Haji Zalmay 
Stanakzai, president of the Zalmay Afghan Group, 
detailed numerous attacks on his projects in 
Nuristan, Helmand, and Badghis. His security 
strategy included pricing security into his project 
budgets from 2 percent to 18 percent, employing 
a full-time security manager, holding a shura with 
local elders before beginning a project, and hiring 
as many local workers and security guards as 
possible. He had full confidence in this approach, 
stating, “I will do business anywhere.” 
Meanwhile, the president of another 
construction company, which employed a 
community-based security strategy in an unstable 
region of Afghanistan, was planning to shut down 
his business and move to Dubai. He explained, 
“Things are getting worse because of Karzai. 
People are starting to support the Taliban again. 
But I will never negotiate with them or support 
them. It is difficult to be honest and successful in 
Afghanistan.”
Security was a significant consideration for 
mining companies operating in unstable regions 
of Afghanistan. An Afghan mining executive 
described insecurity as a fact of life. As his company 
became more successful, the Taliban increasingly 
targeted his management, workers, and truckers 
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transporting materials from an unstable rural area 
to his urban processing facility. His marketing 
strategy was a delicate balancing act: he tried to 
raise the company’s profile while maintaining a low 
personal profile. Like many Afghan businessmen, 
he was fearful of kidnappings. He had decreased 
his quarry visits from three or four times a month 
to once a month. He concluded, “I worry about 
insecurity. It is worsening. It drives my costs up.” 
The president of another mining company 
was similarly concerned. Traveling to his quarries 
required a four- to six-hour escorted walk on a 
foot trail through lawless areas. Eight months 
ago, he had stopped visiting his mines due to 
fear of kidnapping. He had received night letters 
threatening him and his workers. He felt that 
support from the United States made him an 
even greater target. He mitigated security risks 
through negotiation with the local elders, which he 
described as “the only strategy I have. I can’t afford 
more security so I need a local-focused policy. I 
don’t involve the government and police. They are 
not trustworthy. You don’t know who is working 
for whom.”
Roshan Telecom, the largest telecommunications 
company in Afghanistan, successfully employed 
a community-based security strategy. Recently, 
the company transitioned responsibility for its 
tower site security from outside forces to local 
communities across the country. The shift allowed 
Roshan to support local communities through job 
creation and empowerment. The company said 
that these communities felt a sense of ownership 
over the site that they administered. The company 
recounted instances in which a site had been 
switched off at night, and the community has 
come to Roshan and said ‘switch it on, we’ll 
guarantee the security.’ Roshan saw a decrease in 
the number of attacks to sites and has incentivized 
communities to ensure site safety through a 
quarterly bonus. Through this program, Roshan has 
been able to reduce operational costs per site and 
achieve an overall cost savings of about 30 percent 
each year.69 
Most businesses were concerned about 
deteriorating security throughout the country, 
often stating that security underpinned a strong 
business environment. However, companies were 
most concerned about uncertainty, including 
corruption, access to capital, infrastructure, and 
a variety of other factors beyond pure physical 
insecurity. In particular, they viewed the national 
government as weak, insurgents as emboldened, 
and the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) as having a wavering commitment, all of 
which fueled this unpredictability and a variety of 
hedging strategies.
A modern shopping mall in Herat City. (Jake Cusack)
International Actors 
Many businesses interviewed viewed ISAF as a 
key guarantor of stability in Afghanistan. These 
companies wanted ISAF to remain in Afghanistan 
in the near term and feared the consequences 
of a withdrawal. A business owner in Nangarhar 
Province commented, “ISAF has a positive effect. 
When the U.S. came to Afghanistan initially, 
the warlords were weakened. If the U.S. leaves 
Afghanistan, it will be like the Northern Alliance 
versus the Taliban again. Nangarhar will have 
ten to fifteen governors.” A Nangarhar trader 
added, “I am optimistic about the future. I have 
hope, inshallah. But it is connected to the foreign 
troops.”
Simultaneously, businesses expressed resentment 
towards ISAF, international organizations, and 
donors for supporting corrupt government officials 
and foreign contractors and for failing to provide 
key needs for the business community. Beyond 
security and corruption, common complaints 
centered on the international community’s inability 
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to provide power, roads, and access to capital, 
and to stop foreign dumping. A senior official at 
the Afghan Investment Support Authority stated, 
“Donors are spending millions of dollars, but for 
nothing. Many grants are wasteful. Factories have 
stopped…industries are not profitable. There 
are only a few small industries ... there are no 
industries in the rural areas.”
Businesses varied dramatically in how closely 
they were willing to work with the international 
community. Some, particularly in the construction 
sector, made work with foreigners a key 
component of their business strategy. Meanwhile, 
others sought to remain independent, concerned 
about security risks associated with working with 
foreigners or about the sustainability of these 
partnerships given the eventual ISAF withdrawal. 
Finally, many businesses viewed donor funding as 
a substitute for bank loans and the only external 
financing that they seriously considered. 
IV. Sector Analysis
Overview
Business development has varied significantly 
across different sectors of the Afghan economy. 
For example, agriculture employs the majority 
of the country’s labor force but occurs largely at 
the subsistence level. The mining sector holds an 
estimated $1 trillion of natural resource wealth, 
but is also largely underdeveloped, with mining’s 
contribution to GDP less than 0.3 percent.70 
Light manufacturing, carpets, crafts, gemstones, 
and other smaller sectors have experienced 
modest gains, while construction, security, 
and transportation sectors have proliferated 
with increased demand from the international 
community. Segments of the service sector, such as 
telecommunications, have flourished due to strong 
demand and innovative distribution methods, while 
information technology, urban services, and other 
areas remain nascent or underdeveloped.
The following section will examine five sectors 
of the Afghan economy, surveying each sector’s 
background and challenges, and profiling a specific 
company to illustrate key obstacles. 
Agriculture
Agriculture plays a vital role in the Afghan economy, 
accounting for 31 percent of GDP. It is the main 
livelihood for the rural population, responsible for 
78.6 percent of national employment. Products 
include wheat, rice, corn, beans, melons, grapes, 
apricots, pomegranates, oranges, almonds, 
pistachios, and walnuts. After a severe drought 
in 2008−9, last year’s harvest led to agriculture 
output growth of 36 percent, with dried fruits and 
seeds accounting for half of total exports.71 Donor 
initiatives have aimed to address gaps in the value 
chain, train farmers in modern agriculture methods, 
and provide basic infrastructure.
Modern raisin sorting and processing equipment is used at 
Tabasom Raisins, near Kabul. Tabasom has approximately 
100 employees and can process between 20 and 25  
tons of raisins per day. (Jake Cusack)
Problems
•  Productivity: Agriculture employs over three-
quarters of workers yet accounts for less than 
one-third of economic output. Less than half of 
Afghanistan’s 19.5 million arable acres are under 
cultivation, with only 25 percent of irrigation 
systems currently operating. Many farmers do 
not have enough acreage to be self-sufficient. 
Additional problems include inadequate access 
to credit, poor road networks, and unreliable 
electricity.72
•  Value capture: A lack of processing, packaging, 
and cold storage facilities causes most value-add 
to occur in neighboring countries.
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•  Poppy: Poppy remains Afghanistan’s most 
lucrative agricultural export, complicating efforts 
to transition farmers to other crops.73
Company Profile: Rahmani  
Dried Fruits and Nuts
The Jalalabad-based Rahmani Dried Fruits and 
Nuts Company is owned and operated by Ajmal 
Rahmani, who also is president of the Nangarhar 
Dried Fruits Association. He contracts with as 
many as 300 farmers of walnuts, almonds, 
peanuts, pistachios, raisins, corn, and berries. At 
harvest, he collects, cleans, and processes dried 
fruits and nuts, selling 30 percent domestically 
and exporting the remaining 70 percent to 
primarily Pakistan, India, and Dubai. He estimated 
annual sales growth of 10-12 percent in recent 
years. He has never sought external financing 
and allocates no money to marketing, using his 
reputation and position as association president 
to generate sales. He has leveraged initiatives 
by the US-Asia Foundation, the Afghanistan 
Chamber of Commerce and Industries (ACCI), and 
the Afghanistan Small and Medium Enterprise 
Development (ASMED) to attend international 
trade exhibitions, make promotional brochures, 
and fund measures to develop export markets 
for association members. In the future, he hoped 
to open processing, cold storage, and packaging 
facilities. He viewed increased export sales as key 
to his company and association’s growth.
•  Security: Rahmani commented that insecurity 
is worsening in Jalalabad and the surrounding 
provinces, requiring him to maintain a personal 
bodyguard. He detailed a recent incident in 
which criminals had stolen a shipment of his 
goods. He estimated that security accounts 
for 10-15 percent of his total costs. He paid 
a premium to truckers to insure his goods in 
transit. Moreover, security complicated his ability 
to find a location for a new factory. “I plan to 
make a new factory, but where? I can’t find a 
good location because of security problems.” 
•  Middlemen: Rahmani cited the challenges 
of “being independent and finding a direct 
market without middlemen. Pakistan always 
influences the market. I export to Pakistan and it 
captures all the value.” He used donor-sponsored 
international trade exhibitions in Dubai, 
India, Iran, and Russia to cut out unnecessary 
middlemen, better understand market demand, 
and establish more direct links to his customers. 
He viewed developing export markets as a main 
priority for his company and association.
•  Capacity: Rahmani detailed a number of 
problems relating to a lack of domestic capacity. 
“Because I don’t have storage facilities and my 
goods are perishable, I can’t keep them for a long 
time. So I sell them quickly, often at a low price.” 
Mining
Afghanistan is endowed with significant mineral 
wealth, particularly iron, copper, cobalt, gold, 
niobium, and lithium. A much-publicized New 
York Times report estimated the worth of these 
resources at $1 trillion based on Afghan, Russian, 
and American surveys.74 The Afghan government 
and international community view mining as a 
long-term source of sustainable revenue for an 
economy reliant on foreign aid, opium production, 
and narcotics trafficking. “This will become the 
backbone of the Afghan economy,” said Jalil 
Jumriany, an advisor to the Afghan minister of 
mines.75 A western official stated, “Exploiting 
Afghanistan’s mineral resources is how Afghanistan 
can pay its bills when donors take off.” However, 
outside of the China Metallurgical Group’s venture 
at the Aynak Copper Mine, most mining in 
Afghanistan does not focus on rare earth minerals, 
but rather marble or gemstones. 
Problems
•  Insufficient infrastructure: Little industrial 
infrastructure exists to exploit Afghanistan’s 
mineral wealth. Most mining occurs at a small-
scale level, employs primitive extraction methods 
such as dynamite blasting that can destroy over 
80 percent of the value of the mineral, and is 
impeded by poor road networks and power supply. 
•  Governmental capacity: The Ministry of Mines 
is inexperienced in developing and managing 
Afghanistan’s mineral resources. The U.S. 
Department of Defense’s Task Force for Business 
and Stability Operations and international 
accounting firms are mentoring the ministry 
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on the establishment of systems, contracting 
procedures, and technical data for multinational 
mining companies and foreign investors.76
•  Foreign Reluctance: A western official explained 
the initial reluctance of foreign mining companies 
to work in Afghanistan, “The big multinational 
mining companies don’t want to get involved 
initially. What you want to do is incentivize 
small wildcat companies that can afford to go 
bankrupt. They will incur the high risk for the 
prospect of high benefits of handing over the 
rights to a larger company.” Additionally, this 
official mentioned outside fears of potential 
nationalization of contracts as another major 
deterrent to attracting foreign mining companies 
to Afghanistan.
Company Profile: Afghan Marble 
Company (Name Changed)
Founded in 2004, this marble company operates 
in unstable areas of Afghanistan with forty to fifty 
local staff. Last year, it reported sales of $100,000, 
70 percent domestically and 30 percent abroad 
(China, Dubai, Italy). It extracts approximately 
three tons of marble per day through a dynamite 
blasting technique that destroys over 80 percent 
of the marble’s value. With the help of a $228,000 
three-year bank loan and an $80,000 grant 
from the USAID-sponsored ASMED program, 
the company purchased a wire-cutting machine 
that it hopes will increase daily production 
by approximately 800 percent, curtail value 
destruction caused by dynamite blasting, and lead 
to increased revenues and job creation. A company 
executive remained cautiously optimistic about 
the future, hoping that that increased production, 
quality, and exports would lead to growth. 
However, he concluded, “It’s hard to say about the 
future. Things are uncertain.” 
•  Power: A company executive cited lack of 
electricity as his biggest constraint to growth. 
He complained about relying on expensive 
diesel generators for most of the day. He stated, 
“Progress in development is determined by 
power.” 
•  Insecurity: Insurgents threatened the company’s 
management, quarry workers, and truckers, 
forced management to limit quarry visits due to 
fear of kidnapping, and drove up operational 
costs. A company executive explained, “I can’t 
complain to the police or the government 
because it will make the problem bigger. My only 
strategy is to negotiate directly with the Taliban. 
My last option is to pay them.”
•  Anti-business policies: A company executive 
commented, “The government doesn’t 
understand what a market economy is. It is 
our Communist legacy.” He highlighted the 
bureaucratic contracting process with the 
Ministry of Mines, high fees and taxes, and a 
generally unsupportive policy framework for 
his company. He contrasted Afghanistan with 
Pakistan, stating, “Pakistan has lower taxes. It 
has good roads. It provides electricity. It has a 
better tax collection system.”
Construction
A massive construction boom has characterized the 
post-Taliban era. Efforts have focused on rebuilding 
war-torn infrastructure and providing for the 
large foreign military contingent in Afghanistan. 
The international community has spent billions of 
dollars on real estate developments, roads, schools, 
clinics, culverts, bridges, and civil-military projects. 
In recent years, the construction sector has grown 
approximately 10 percent per annum, accounting 
for $770 million in 2008−9 and 10 percent of 
GDP. While the number of Afghan construction 
companies has tripled since 2003, the overall 
number of jobs has been decreasing.77
Problems
•  Quality: Fraud, waste, and abuse have reduced 
the impact of construction projects to the Afghan 
population. 
•  Subcontracting: The loss of accountability 
through multiple levels of subcontracting leads to 
shoddy project quality.
•  Sustainability: Foreign donors have financed 
much of the construction boom, leading to 
sustainability concerns when ISAF draws down in 
Afghanistan.78 
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Company Profile: Latifi Shigiwal 
Construction Company (LSCC)
Founded in 2004, the Jalalabad-based LSCC 
operates throughout central, eastern and northern 
Afghanistan. It employs fifty Afghan staff and 
two Pakistani engineers. Its projects include roads, 
bridges, schools, clinics, and irrigation systems. It 
contracts primarily through ISAF and the Afghan 
government. The company sources sand, gravel, 
and stones locally and procures most other 
construction materials from Pakistan, India, and 
Russia. It reported $1 million revenues last year and 
annual growth of 10-20 percent in recent years. 
Prior to 2004, the company was an NGO named 
Hendokosh, working with Mercy Fund in support 
of the UN and international NGOs in rehabilitating 
Afghanistan through small-scale community 
development projects. 
•  Security: Security was a rising concern for LSCC 
President Abdul Latifi. His brother, who was an 
employee at LSCC, had been killed in the past 
year outside of Bagram Airfield. He was no longer 
able to visit his projects in unstable locations 
due to security risks and fear of kidnapping. 
He commented, “The situation is changing. 
Afghans are starting to support the Taliban.” He 
recounted a recent incident in which fifteen local 
security guards at one of his projects guided the 
Taliban to his engineers. He added, “If I can’t 
negotiate with the shura (council of local elders), 
then I quit. I will never negotiate with or support 
the Taliban.” 
•  Future: Latifi estimated an 80 percent chance 
that he would move his family from Afghanistan 
to Pakistan or Dubai within the year. He 
viewed ISAF’s continued presence as central 
to Afghanistan’s future. “Donors are having 
a positive impact. But, the future situation 
depends on the U.S. government. Whenever it 
leaves, there will be a Punjabi government in 
Kabul.”79
Import-Export
Throughout history, Afghanistan’s location on the 
Silk Road at the crossroads of Central and South 
Asia and the Middle East has created a vibrant 
trading economy. Even during the past thirty years 
of conflict, trade has persisted and flourished. In 
recent years, total imports and exports have topped 
$6 billion.80 Key exports include fresh and dried 
fruits, medicinal plants, spices, seeds, skins, wool, 
carpets, and crafts. Key imports include machinery 
and equipment, petroleum, metals, chemicals, 
construction materials, foodstuffs, cigarettes, 
beverages, textiles, footwear, household items,  
and medicine.
Problems
•  Trade Deficit: Imports dwarfed exports, leading 
to a harmful trade imbalance with far-ranging 
consequences for the Afghan economy.81 
•  Infrastructure: Afghanistan’s poor road, rail, 
and air networks, inefficient customs processes, 
corruption, and insecurity limit the extent of 
trade occurring within the country and between 
neighboring countries.
•  Borders: Afghanistan’s lack of border control 
gives rise to a large informal economy and 
foreign dumping that undercuts domestic 
producers.82
Company Profile: Afghan Trading 
Company (Name Changed)
Founded in 1973, this export-import company 
specializes in used trucks, automobiles, spare parts, 
appliances, electronics, toiletries, and medicines. 
It buys discounted goods from Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Japan and resells them at a profit 
in Afghanistan. The company imported goods 
from the Karachi port overland through Pakistan to 
Torkham Gate and distributed them in the eastern 
and central provinces. Last year, the company 
had approximately $200,000 in sales, which had 
been declining in recent years. It employs eleven 
workers, a decrease from thirty-five in 2007.
•  Insecurity: A company executive described a 
deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan that had damaged his business. 
A few years ago, he did not incorporate security 
costs into his budget. Now, he estimated that 
security represented 20 percent of his total costs 
and had been steadily rising in recent months. 
He described attacks on his containers in 
Pakistan. He was concerned about the future, 
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stating, “My whole business relies on security in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.”
•  Corruption: A company executive outlined 
a number of negative encounters with the 
national and provincial government. A dispute 
with a senior government official forced him 
to shut down his plaza in Kabul and move his 
family to Peshawar and relocate his business. 
He stated, “I brought up the issue to the high 
court, but received death threats and was told 
if I didn’t leave I would be killed.” Regarding 
corruption, he said, “The government is causing 
problems with traders. Officials purchase their 
positions and are connected to powerful people, 
especially in customs. I already pay high taxes and 
customs, but then they want bribes too. The big 
businessmen act like a mafia and defeat small 
businessmen.”
•  International community: A company executive 
expressed anger at the international community 
for enabling the current government’s corruption. 
He asked, “Why is the U.S. supporting these 
people? This president, these ministers, and 
these provincial governors will never get 
better. The U.S. should change its strategy. It’s 
spending billions of dollars and soldiers are 
dying, but things are getting worse. It should 
send these criminals to jail. It should hire honest, 
skilled professional people. It should help our 
government develop our business policies.” 
Light Manufacturing
Afghanistan has a broad range of import-
substitution and export industries. Some import-
substitution industries, including foodstuffs, 
beverages, and motorcycles, represent some of the 
country’s most successful and entrepreneurial firms. 
Other industries such as shoes, plastic sandals, 
plastic dishes, and ice also have experienced 
rapid growth.83 In 2010, carpet making was 
Afghanistan’s second-largest export industry, 
accounting for 38 percent of exports.84 Donors 
have sought to grow import-substitution and 
export industries through Afghan First, directing 
the procurement of Afghan-made products by 
the international community, regional trade 
agreements, and international trade exhibitions.85
Problems
•  Anti-producer environment: Uncertainty, 
instability, and a strong trading economy have 
stunted development of Afghanistan’s productive 
capacities. 
•  Dumping: Dumping of Pakistani and Iranian 
imports and ruthless price wars have made it 
difficult for Afghan manufacturers to survive.
•  Infrastructure: Problems related to electricity, 
land, and capital have inhibited manufacturing 
growth. 
Company Profile: Tajzada Group
The Mazar-e-Sharif−based Tajzada Group is a 
family-run conglomerate with a carpet-making 
business. Throughout Afghanistan’s northern 
provinces, the carpet-making company has ninety 
direct employees and 3,500 indirect employees 
involved in the weaving, cutting, and washing 
process. Last year, it had sales of approximately 
$120,000 and 24,000 square meters of carpet. 
The majority was exported to Pakistan, Turkey, 
and Dubai. Since 2002, it estimated sales growth 
at 15-20 percent. Recently, Tajzada won a 
€65,000 German government grant to build a 
design center and a €100,000 grant to construct 
carpet-making facilities. Additionally, it has begun 
growing its own silk after receiving land from the 
Ministry of Agriculture. In the future, it hopes to 
generate growth by increasing sales in the U.S. and 
European markets.
•  Independence and diversification: The 
group’s general director pursued a strategy of 
vertical integration, family ownership, and no 
external financing to maximize its operational 
independence. Five brothers, two working in 
Afghanistan and three working abroad, managed 
the group’s companies, including trading, trucking, 
jewelry, and craft subsidiaries. The group’s 
management felt that diversification allowed it to 
hedge against risk in the business environment. 
•  Pakistan: The general director complained about 
the negative impact of Pakistan’s anticompetitive 
practices on his business. He stated that Pakistani 
traders replaced the “Made in Afghanistan” tags 
with “Made in Pakistan” tags on his carpets and 
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collected an 18 percent subsidy from the Pakistani 
government before exporting them abroad. He 
hoped to establish direct market linkages in the 
United States and Europe in order to minimize 
the negative effect of Pakistan on his business. 
•  Security: The general director operated his 
business from Pakistan during the Taliban years 
and returned to Afghanistan in 2002. He was 
becoming increasingly concerned about the 
security situation in northern Afghanistan. He 
described a recent incident in which the Taliban 
burned two of his trucks twenty-five kilometers 
from Mazar-e-Sharif. He was forced to pay a 
ransom to release two of his drivers. Personally, 
he attempted to keep a low profile. He did not 
advertise his business, did not have company 
signs outside his facilities, and did not hire 
security guards, explaining, “It’s better not to 
have security guards. I would need a battalion 
of them anyway.” He concluded, “If the Taliban 
returns to power, I will shut down.”
Summary
Across the agriculture, mining, import-export, 
construction, and light manufacturing sectors, 
several themes emerged: 
•  Many companies felt that security was 
worsening, but viewed this trend as a larger 
problem of uncertainty and unpredictability in the 
business environment.
•  They felt constrained by a lack of infrastructure 
and capacity, especially regarding power supply.
•  They were disenchanted and distrustful with 
the Afghan government, which they viewed as 
incompetent, corrupt, and predatory.
•  Small-scale importer-exporters and industries 
complained of the monopolistic behavior of their 
large-scale counterparts and foreign competitors, 
respectively. 
•  They were worried about their respective 
businesses’ and the country’s futures beyond the 
departure of ISAF.
•  They were often supportive of ISAF’s presence, 
but resentful of its support of corrupt 
government officials and disproportionate 
spending on security initiatives relative to 
development initiatives.
•  They employed many of the adaptive strategies 
outlined earlier in the report, i.e. vertically 
integrating, pursuing short-term over long-term 
opportunities, and buying security in multiple 
ways. 
Of those businesses that had failed completely—
and those that never really started—a common 
theme was the lack of powerful allies. Without the 
assistance of those with resources and influence, 
Afghan entrepreneurs often could not surmount 
the many obstacles facing them.
Inside a shop in the Aino Mina housing development 
outside of Kandahar. (Jake Cusack)
V. Recommendations
Thousands of Afghans and internationals have 
worked to rebuild Afghanistan’s economy, 
sometimes even sacrificing their lives in the process. 
According to the Afghanistan Ministry of Finance’s 
“Donor Financial Review” published in November 
2009, international donors had disbursed $35 
billion in development assistance from 2002 to 
2009. As of September 2010, the United States 
alone had cumulatively allocated $56 billion for 
relief and reconstruction.86 These efforts have 
led to several notable achievements. USAID seed 
grants have launched Afghanistan’s promising 
media sector. The National Solidarity Program has 
allowed 24,000 rural communities to oversee small 
development projects, earning an economic rate 
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of return estimated at 20 percent on over $750 
million of disbursed funds.87 Military procurement 
of water and soda from Afghan companies 
has assisted Afghanistan’s growing beverage 
industry. With international help, the Afghanistan 
Investment Support Agency has become a useful 
resource for investors and businesses by keeping 
financial records in the country. 
Overlapping reports dating back to 2002 
have identified key constraints to business in 
Afghanistan, on a sector-by-sector basis, but with 
questionable effects on policy.88 In 2007, the Aga 
Khan Development Network hosted a conference 
on the “Enabling Environment for Business” that 
produced a detailed roadmap of areas requiring 
improvement. A July 2010 review found that 
implementation of its recommendations had 
faltered. 
Good ideas have failed to translate into 
meaningful results due to uneven implementation. 
Without accountability, many white papers and 
studies have been written—several advocating 
similar recommendations to this paper—with no 
evaluation of their subsequent effectiveness.89
Ironically, while in some cases there is too much 
top-down planning—donors using a supply-driven 
approach to force unilateral changes in a sector—
there also is very little central planning at the very 
top. ANDS is broad brush, but beyond that, there 
is no guidance for which sectors are prioritized, 
which donors are working in what areas, and how 
success should be measured.
Navigating and understanding the development 
landscape in Afghanistan is murkier and more 
difficult than acquiring information on military 
force disposition and kinetic operations. Even at 
a high level within the U.S. policy establishment, 
officials can be unaware of competing or 
overlapping projects. In some cases, donors 
undermine each other. For example, the Aga Khan 
Foundation began a program of providing seeds 
and saplings for a small fee to farmers, only to find 
that another donor started giving away the same 
inputs for free. 
Our primary intent was not to assess the 
effectiveness of past programs but rather the 
challenges, opportunities, and narratives of Afghan 
businesses. We believe that much as military 
strategy has shifted its focus to protecting the 
Afghan population, commercial policy must shift 
its focus to empowering the Afghan entrepreneur 
and firm. In doing so, donors must remain aware of 
their own limitations, and focus on setting the right 
context rather than being overly prescriptive. The 
following recommendations stem from common 
themes emerging in interviews with Afghans and 
development officials.90
1. Infuse private-sector talent to 
support Afghan businesses. 
Appoint a single coordinator for private-sector 
development activities. Little business expertise 
exists within the U.S. military, the Department 
of State, and USAID personnel. While General 
Petraeus and Ambassador Eikenberry coordinate 
military and political efforts, no senior visible 
American representative is tasked with economic 
growth. The quiet DoD Task Force for Business 
and Stability Operations is a step forward, but 
insufficient by itself. A senior public official should 
be appointed and given operational control of the 
disparate American stakeholders in this field. 
Embed private-sector talent in the 
international effort and Afghan businesses. 
When tactical military leaders need advice on 
economic growth issues, to whom can they go? 
The only option may be a USAID official at the 
provincial level—who is most likely more focused 
on governance, democracy, and capacity-building 
projects than on private-sector development. 
We believe that part of the reason that military 
counterinsurgency doctrine has embraced some 
staid development ideas rather than business 
solutions is because the military has no ready 
linkages to business expertise. 
For the Afghan business, despite their many 
talents and entrepreneurial spirits, few are 
knowledgeable about how to expand a business. 
(Zarang Motorcycles, as previously mentioned, 
would be a notable exception.) Often unwilling 
to delegate or keep detailed records, they have 
trouble growing beyond family business or more 
than thirty or so employees. Too often, their idea 
of marketing does not extend beyond trying to 
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get their shop near the right locale—paper shops 
on “paper” street, bakeries on “bakery” streets.91 
One development official noted that in advising 
businesses, “you have to explain almost everything; 
they simply did not grow up surrounded by 
examples of [semisophisticated] business, as an 
American would.”
In attracting and leveraging private-sector 
talent, domestic gaps can be filled with expertise 
from the Afghan diaspora and foreign business 
professionals who wish to lend their assistance. 
Another less-obvious category of talent to consider 
is the burgeoning population of MBAs, many of 
whom have prior military or nonprofit experience 
in developing countries. Robert Mosbacher, 
former head of the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation, has suggested a “BizCorps” model, 
similar to the Peace Corps, where graduating 
MBAs spend eighteen months working to develop 
businesses in partnership with entrepreneurs in 
post-conflict and developing countries. Initiatives 
leveraging this talent must be structured to 
avoid crippling bureaucracy that impedes many 
development projects—large security footprints, 
tight restrictions on freedom of movement, and 
an onerous reporting paperwork burden. Ideally, 
this new structure would allow for paying and 
incentivizing performance in a way similar to the 
private sector. 
Cultivate needed private-sector awareness. 
Our research saw Afghans responding rationally to 
perceived incentives. Consequently, internationals 
must be sensitive to second-order effects of their 
actions. NGOs often undermine private-sector 
development by stealing top talent. Government 
corruption means that profit seekers find an 
office posting a much more lucrative route than 
starting a business, and thus the elimination 
of entrepreneurship in legitimate sectors drives 
corruption, drug trade, and cronyism. Lastly, 
free money from donors that funds everything 
from computers to business services drives out 
the nascent private competitors and creates the 
“donor-drunk” culture where Afghans expect 
something for nothing. As Jahid Mohseni notes, 
this means that Afghans often are starting 
businesses based on where donor funding is and 
not on what they actually think is sustainable. 
Mohseni suggests that parts of the manufacturing 
sector have been inflated because of the American 
perception that it seems more “western,” and that 
Afghans tailor their proposals accordingly. Just as 
cultural sensitivity has been emphasized, so also 
should economic issues be stressed in the training 
and strategy of international forces.
2. Change development incentives 
to reward implementation and 
long-term results. 
Encourage experimentation and document 
results. Unique conditions call for an experimental 
and pragmatic approach that seeks to rapidly 
adapt plans based on results. Unfortunately, in the 
wealth of studies on Afghanistan, there are few 
that measure a baseline, describe an intervention 
undertaken by donors or the military, and then 
measure the subsequent long-term outcomes. 
Even those that do document success or failure 
usually focus simply on program outputs—money 
spent, people trained, conferences held, buildings 
constructed—rather than more meaningful indirect 
measures, such as average income, price changes 
for needed goods, employment rates, import-export 
levels, etc. Because data on what has previously 
worked is hard to find, many implementers rely on 
anecdotal knowledge or past experience. 
The rigorous multiyear Randomized Impact 
Evaluation of the National Solidarity Program 
(NSP) provides a useful model for monitoring 
and evaluating project efficacy. Led by a team 
of both academic researchers and development 
officials, it has conducted multiple surveys of 500 
villages—half of which had the NSP intervention 
and half of which are a control group. A very 
comprehensive set of measured variables allow 
the evaluation to examine how NSP has influenced 
governance perceptions, the role of women, the 
status of infrastructure, agricultural yields, income, 
consumption, and more.92 Within the context 
of the evaluation, they also have conducted 
subtreatment interventions, experimenting at 
the margins to evaluate the impact of different 
methods of project selection and implementation. 
More studies of this ilk, particularly in areas of 
attempted private-sector interventions, could 
provide an effective library of success and failure 
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factors to guide future development efforts. The 
rigorous compilation of military “after-action 
reports” that have proven effective for sharing 
the best tactics in dealing with roadside bombs 
and adaptive insurgents can be emulated in the 
economic realm.
Such long-term monitoring and evaluation 
also would allow for judging and rewarding 
performance in a meaningful way. In the absence 
of typical business incentives predicated on a deal 
being executed, development officers are rewarded 
equally for the appearance of progress as they are 
for real progress. Good media coverage and nicely 
written grant reports can inflate success or provide 
incorrect case studies for duplication.
Get close to problems and enable “drivers.” 
Instead of having hundreds of people writing 
white papers and vaguely responsible for many 
different sectors, place people at the ground 
level accountable for a single task. One U.S. 
development officer noted that “all our people are 
getting stuck in internal policy meetings feeding the 
Washington information beast.” Navy Lieutenant 
Tim Graczewski told the story of going out to brief 
the economic growth plan to coalition officials in 
the most important district in Kandahar Province, 
and finding that there were only two people 
to receive the briefing—the Battalion Executive 
Officer, who certainly had many other issues on 
his plate, and a PRT (Provincial Reconstruction 
Team) representative, whose primary focus was 
governance. It is as if, he said, “Microsoft had a 
thousand people doing corporate strategy, but 
there are only two software engineers actually 
developing a product. And so the strategists arrive 
with their PowerPoints on market segmentation 
and value chain analysis, and the two engineers 
look at them like they just came from Mars.” 
Lieutenant Graczewski went on, “The closer you 
are to the ground, the more obvious and simple 
the problems become.” Afghan businessmen 
echoed this sentiment in their own way, noting 
the disadvantages of trying to do business in 
Afghanistan from Dubai or London, even with 
longtime trusted local managers. Sadat Naderi, 
owner of grocery stores, an insurance company, 
and fuel distributors, said: “I need to be here, 
leading my troops.”
A possible model here could be similar to the 
special forces/transition team military concept, 
in which business personnel could be embedded 
in specific Afghan businesses with a focus on 
developing the Afghan’s abilities rather than doing 
it for them. The director of Afghanistan’s national 
electricity authority noted that one major problem 
with development consultants and their projects 
is that often no actual knowledge transfer to the 
resident Afghan workers takes place.
Eliminate layers of aid spending. Aid spending 
should be streamlined, removing inefficient layers 
of subcontractors, which erodes accountability and 
undermines project completion. Furthermore, the 
current reliance on subcontractors creates perverse 
incentives to actors who seek to make money as 
pure middlemen without creating value. The calls 
to push more aid through the Afghanistan national 
government should be moderated by the reality that 
such government-channeled aid often has delivered 
minimal results, enriched officials and their cronies, 
and pushed out private-sector enterprises. 
Be willing to accept failure and change 
approaches. Unlike a business, which will 
cut its losses and move on, each layer of a 
traditional development project lacks incentive to 
acknowledge failure. Elegant reports with glossy 
pictures substitute for real performance and are 
rewarded with continued funding. One senior 
business development official described how the 
implementer, the beneficiary, and donor all will 
keep pouring effort into a misguided venture 
because they are evaluated on input metrics of 
money spent and hours worked and output metrics 
of social “intangible” factors.
Be comfortable with enabling profitable 
enterprises. Some within the State Department, 
USAID, and other development agencies seem 
fundamentally uncomfortable with the idea that 
a good business will enrich its owners. As Robert 
Mosbacher, former head of OPIC, noted to us, it 
is as if some believe that profit is illegitimate or 
immoral, and private-sector projects must deliver 
equal benefits to all. This has created a culture 
where Afghans applying for a grant hide the 
“profit” part of their business plan in inflated costs 
because they think the donors will not support 
a project that may reward the owners.93 It also 
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enables a parasitic government that preys on the 
revenues of others and sees the private sector as a 
rival. In yet another perverse incentive, international 
donor organizations and NGOs often prefer to give 
contracts and business to other NGOs rather than 
for-profit ventures.94
Recognize profit as a legitimate metric. 
Interviewing business owners often was a 
refreshing change from too much time spent 
sipping chai with government officials. When asked 
about results, the latter tend to talk in intangibles 
buzzwords—coordinated governance, capacity 
building—while the former talk in survival terms. 
Ask a politician for a hard number and they almost 
always had to get back to you; ask a good business 
owner how much their costs are and they could 
rattle them off from memory. 
Our experience ran parallel to an argument 
made by Ann Bernstein that was recently 
summarized in The Economist:
    Companies benefit society simply by going about 
their normal business. In a free and competitive 
market, firms profit by selling goods or services to 
willing customers. To stay in business, they must 
offer lower prices or higher quality than their 
competitors. Those that fail disappear. Those that 
succeed spread prosperity. Shareholders receive 
dividends. Employees earn wages. Suppliers win 
contracts. Ordinary people gain access to luxuries 
that would have made Cecil Rhodes gasp, such 
as television, air-conditioning and antibiotics.95
In Afghanistan, distortions and insecurity create 
opportunities to profit in unhelpful ways—by 
extracting value rather than creating it. But this does 
not mean that all worthwhile projects need heavy 
subsidies. Indeed, allowing businesses to succeed 
or fail with the minimal necessary support can be 
a valuable barometer for donors to see through 
boisterous rhetoric and talented scam artists.
Additionally, in enforcing accountability, 
distinctions must be made between projects 
intended for social good and those intended to 
make a profit and scale for future growth. The 
muddying of the two metrics has resulted in 
projects that satisfy neither goal. Some projects 
that create valuable social change, such as enabling 
and empowering women through household 
income generation projects, should not be 
accountable to pure for-profit metrics. As one 
development officer said: “If you want to run this 
like a business, the first thing you would do is fire 
eighteen of the twenty employees.” 
Conversely, donors should neither support bad 
business ideas because of alleged community 
benefits nor weigh down a good business with 
additional “social” requirements. Another 
development officer described the creation of 
an apprenticeship program to replace foreigner 
labor in an industrial park: he was first required 
by superiors to employ ex-combatants for the 
project; then he was asked to additionally employ 
handicapped workers. Neither category of 
employee were necessarily best suited for a pilot 
labor replacement project in factories.
Reward and protect safe areas. In Afghanistan, 
certain areas are simply safer for cultural, 
geographic, ethnic reasons. Development expert 
Siri Trang Khalsa refers to such security havens as 
a “natural resource,” which should be similarly 
maximized for growth. A frequent complaint heard 
in more secure areas such as Mazar-e-Sharif and 
Herat is that they have seen comparatively little 
western support, which instead focuses on dumping 
money into the volatile and unstable districts in the 
country, often distorting the local economy. Stable 
areas should be reinforced with key infrastructure 
improvement—for example, already economically 
vibrant Herat would benefit greatly from having an 
international airport, allowing it to bypass Kabul for 
air transporting goods and people. 
Provide a risk/reward framework for military 
development projects. One commonality 
between businesses and the military is that they 
both have developed frameworks that organize 
and account for risk. However, the weakness of the 
military is that while they are good at incentivizing 
and accounting for catastrophic risk to troops or 
civilians (casualties), they are poor at accounting 
for economic risk. There is no clear way that the 
military is held to account for the way they spend 
their emergency funds or propagate other methods 
of economic stimulus—indeed, the incentives often 
are perverse because they reward very short-term 
stabilization gains that can lead to long-term 
structural problems.
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3. Support Afghan enterprises with 
a better regulatory and operating 
environment, public-private 
partnerships, and linkages to 
multinational firms. 
The Afghan government, with international support, 
should aim to create a pro-business environment 
that provides incentives, protections, and access to 
domestic and foreign markets for Afghan industries. 
Poor infrastructure, corruption, foreign dumping 
and inability to access markets, insurance, and 
financing all hamper Afghan firms’ ability to gain a 
foothold domestically and compete internationally. 
The Afghan government and international 
community can facilitate the formation and 
expansion of enterprises in these sectors through 
a variety of measures: increasing public-private 
cooperation; incentivizing multinational companies 
to partner with Afghan firms while mitigating 
risk; increasing domestic production and reducing 
import tariffs on raw materials; improving industrial 
infrastructure, principally power supply and road 
networks; fostering trade linkages between 
different regions of Afghanistan, the economies of 
which often are oriented more toward neighboring 
countries than neighboring provinces; encouraging 
the international community to procure locally 
whenever possible; negotiating bilateral and 
regional trade agreements that curtail dumping 
and increase access to markets in the Persian Gulf, 
India, and the West; and increasing transparency 
and reducing corruption in the government’s 
relationship with the private sector.96
Provide public-sector help in the right places. 
Donor funds should be specifically targeted to 
the areas where returns are minimal or uncertain 
and donors may be the only ones willing to 
invest—for example, in electricity generation, 
road construction, hydropower dams, railways, 
international airports, and other infrastructure. 
In many cases, however, development funds can 
be partnered with private funds for jump-starting 
investment into Afghanistan’s key producers in 
important sectors. Robert Mosbacher argues that 
public money can provide technical assistance to 
enable significant private capital investment that 
might not otherwise occur.97
Development also can play a crucial role in 
bringing buyers and producers together, so that 
the producer can understand how to capture more 
value. Examples include informing carpet makers 
of changing market preferences or educating 
raisin producers about the quality requirements 
for export to the European market. While several 
development organizations already try to do this, 
often the main result is a large general conference 
with questionable results rather than the targeted 
creation of an actual business deal or relationship. 
Brock Dahl, who previously worked with the 
U.S. Treasury Department in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
emphasized the limited role of donor support: 
“The focus of USG programs should be on the 
issues that the businessmen cannot do anything 
about: infrastructure, corruption, security. Then 
try to support indigenous programs to do other 
things like train accountants, etc. Businesses will 
not emerge because of centralized planning, they 
will emerge because entrepreneurial Afghans 
see opportunities, and the right structural 
dynamics exist to enable them to pursue those 
opportunities.”
Improve tax collection and business trust 
in government services. A central challenge 
for economic development in the context 
of counterinsurgency is how the legitimacy 
of government can be increased if aid is not 
channeled through government and if a 
robust private-sector can partially circumvent 
government. This is a key trade-off in combining 
traditional counterinsurgency doctrine and 
sustainable entrepreneurial economic growth. 
While a government role is required for aid 
in certain sectors such as infrastructure and 
education, given the current level of corruption, 
these may be better addressed at the regional and 
local governance level.
In theory, business development can strengthen 
the legitimacy of the government by providing tax 
revenues that allow the government to function. 
However, it also can undermine government by 
becoming a competitor, acting in a self-interested 
manner that is at odds with the public interest. 
In Afghanistan, the public-private relationship is 
complicated: in some respects, conflicts of interest 
blur the lines between public and private; in other 
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respects, a deep-seated hostility exists between the 
two parties. Tax collection is a useful indicator for 
gauging his relationship. Taxes represent a social 
compact: businesses pay taxes with the expectation 
that the government provides basic services and 
creates a favorable business environment. The 
failure of business to pay taxes can be a negative 
sign that businesses believe that government is not 
upholding its responsibility due to incompetence, 
corruption, or illegitimacy; that inconsistent tax 
collection demonstrates unfair exceptions made 
for certain players in the economy; that there 
is a power imbalance between the two parties; 
and that a lack of business activity leads to a 
lack of tax revenue. Currently, poor tax collection 
rates in Afghanistan indicate a fracture in the 
business-government relationship with negative 
consequences for the country’s development.98 
However, it is an area of opportunity for the two 
sectors to cooperate, not compete, in a way that 
can be mutually beneficial. 
Improve Afghan First and local procurement. 
The Afghan market should be properly incentivized 
to produce for western procurement. There is 
inevitable tension between military commanders 
who “need it yesterday and don’t care how you 
do it” and a desire to procure through Afghan 
channels. In the case of satisfying the logistics 
chain, contractors will do whatever it takes to get 
materials there quickly, never mind the distortions 
caused or the local alternatives bypassed. Right 
now, Afghans cannot generally win contracts 
unless they already have the capacity to deliver, 
but they cannot invest in capacity or secure capital 
unless they have a guaranteed contract. A better 
method, and one beginning to be used by the 
Coalition, will issue contracts that state “The ISAF 
will purchase X good in one year’s time from an 
Afghan company if it meets Y specifications,” so 
business can develop to meet a foreseen need. 
Incentives need to change within the western 
contracting ladder as well. For example, an Afghan 
businessman noted that ISAF’s primary food 
contractor works on a cost-plus basis, so there is 
no incentive to switch from flying produce in from 
Dubai to using local goods. To align incentives, 
one option might be to offer to pay the same 
Dubai prices for goods for a full year after the 
switch to Afghan procurement, so the contractor 
realizes the cost savings. However, one important 
qualification to promoting local procurement is 
that internationals must be careful not to create 
entirely artificial industries. It is reasonable to 
worry what might happen to a service industry 
that has grown bloated in support of solely the 
international community.99
Lastly, laudable recent efforts to improve 
contracting oversight and ensure responsible 
allocation should not discourage local 
procurement. New contracting guidelines need to 
be balanced with continuing to proactively give 
Afghans the opportunity to provide goods and 
services for international forces. An NGO worker in 
Kandahar noted that new oversight efforts in fall 
and winter 2010 may have destroyed trust with 
local businesses: “Lots of effort and resources have 
gone into trying to get S2 [intelligence] types to 
vet and approve businesses and contracts, but very 
little effort and resources have gone into positively 
trying to expand access to the contracting process 
or other economic tools.” 
Improve trade relationships. In July 2010, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a bilateral trade 
agreement providing Afghanistan with sea access, 
Pakistan with direct routes to Central Asia, and a 
joint chamber of commerce. Proponents believe 
that the deal will reduce average transit costs by 
half, lower import costs, and make exports more 
competitive for the two countries.100 The pact is a 
positive step in redressing Afghanistan’s $4 billion−
plus trade deficit. Future steps should ensure 
implementation of the agreement, push for greater 
Afghan access to the Indian market, pursue similar 
initiatives with Afghanistan’s northern and western 
neighbors, and provide protective measures for 
Afghan agricultural and industrial producers.101
Prioritize and sequence sector support. 
As businessman Tamim Samee joked, there is 
no magic single sector in Afghanistan besides 
opium. Afghanistan’s economy will have to be 
cobbled together from many different areas. The 
international community has prioritized agriculture 
and mining relative to other sectors due to their 
potential for income and job creation. 
•  Agriculture: Attracting private investment, 
supporting public-private partnerships, and 
coordinating efforts locally, regionally, and 
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nationally will be critical to developing this 
sector. 
•  Mining: The Afghan government and 
international community view mineral resources 
as key to the country’s long-term fiscal woes 
and budget deficit. The Afghan government and 
international community must attract foreign 
investors and multinational mining companies, 
structure negotiations in a way that benefits 
the Afghan population while allaying outside 
fears of insecurity, corruption, and potential 
nationalization, and prevent its mineral wealth 
from becoming a resource curse. 
However, overemphasis on agriculture and 
mining has led to neglect of sectors more 
amenable to entrepreneurship:102
•  Light Manufacturing: In an anti-manufacturing 
environment dominated by monopolistic traders 
and foreign importers, domestic success stories 
are exceptions rather than the norm. The Afghan 
government and international community must 
address key industrial constraints, including 
problems relating to electricity, land, and 
roads, and incentivize Afghan production and 
consumption rather than relying on imports. 
Developing manufacturing linkages to the 
agriculture and mining sectors could be a major 
area of growth.
•  Services: The growth of the telecom sector, 
including $1 billion in investment and 60,000 
new jobs in the past five years, has been one 
of the biggest private-sector success stories in 
the post-Taliban era. Successful companies have 
provided basic needs in an innovative way to 
Afghan consumers. Information technology, 
transportation, logistics, and other service sector 
opportunities have similar potential, but need to 
be accompanied by proper policies, incentives, 
and supports.
4. Increase access to capital and 
business advisory services.
While not as simple as bringing venture capital to 
Afghanistan, there is a clear need for institutions 
that can provide access to capital in equity 
and structured lending forms, with a robust 
and embedded advisory business development 
component.103 Some basic recommendations for 
such institutions include: 
•  Lending should be relationship-based with a 
high degree of involvement of the lender in 
the business, to include ownership stake and 
ongoing advising. This is necessary because of a 
lack of normal lender protections, a high degree 
of corruption and scams, and an internal lack of 
business development skills. For example, instead 
of simply giving a check, lenders might go to 
purchase the equipment with the owners. In the 
absence of secure collateral and exit options, 
financing will often be based on the current 
and future cash flows of the business, with the 
potential for an eventual management buyout of 
the outside capital providers. 
•  Equity-type incentives on the provider side will 
ensure that they choose their projects wisely and 
work for the long term. However, this will be not 
as simple as declaring “30 percent ownership” 
of a company, because the concept of earning a 
profit for shareholders is not obvious to average 
Afghan business owners.104 Alternate options 
would include full partnerships with additional 
payouts to both lender and recipient if certain 
performance targets are reached. While the 
majority of the financing may be in traditional 
debt forms, for example, royalty payments of a 
small percentage of gross sales could be required. 
•  Institutions have to be seen as giving money to 
businesses in an equitable fashion—providing 
equal chances to compete for loans and clear and 
transparent explanations for why applications are 
denied and others chosen. However, this should 
not translate into supporting four separate and 
competing businesses, as some donors have 
occasionally done.
•  Inevitable conflict of interest should be 
announced publicly. (Afghanistan’s business 
community is small, particularly in certain 
sectors.)
•  Lending institutions and business owners must 
agree on a single bottom line. Bad business ideas 
should not masquerade as social good ideas. 
•  Institutions should balance working with already 
successful and connected entrepreneurs with 
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encouraging new and unconnected ones (so as 
to not reinforce existing political and tribal power 
disparities). 
•  A focus on the entrepreneur is the crucial 
element. In a long-term conflict climate, the 
person who shows up at your doorstep asking 
for investment money often cannot be trusted, 
as he may be a local who has become expert at 
gaming a donor system. It is better to identify 
the sector you are interested in, and go scour the 
countryside for the entrepreneur already making 
progress in that area. Once you find a good one, 
keep investing in him or her—human talent is the 
hardest to find and most irreplaceable factor.
5. Make clear long-term 
commitments.
The international community should pair its short-
term approach to stabilization with a long-term 
commitment to Afghanistan’s future in order 
to reduce harmful uncertainty in the business 
environment. In interviews with Afghan businesses 
and foreign investors, the question of what would 
happen in July 2011 and beyond loomed large. 
Based on our interviews, businesses are less 
concerned with troop levels and aid dollars and 
more concerned with whether the international 
posture is predictable beyond the next six months. 
Commitments may be modest and nuanced to 
reflect regional realities, but they must be clear. 
Such statements of commitment should send a 
powerful message that allows businesses to plan 
for the long term, discourages rent-seeking and 
opportunistic behavior, and allays Afghan fears 
of abandonment. Corresponding trust-building 
actions also will be necessary. For example, donors 
can undertake public-private infrastructure projects 
in the more stable areas or provide future purchase 
guarantees to create predictable revenue for 
Afghan businesses. Once given a minimally certain 
framework, Afghan entrepreneurs will find a way.
Recommendations
The five categories of recommendations we make roughly align with the  
classifications of key problems described at the beginning of the paper. 
Problem recommendation
insecurity/Uncertainty Make clear long-term commitments to security, governance, and economic development.
corruption Change incentives to ensure implementation and reward long-term results.
access to capital Increase provision and access to combined capital and business advisory services.
Physical and Human infrastructure
Facilitate public-private partnerships in the 
development of power, roads, and other key 
infrastructure, and infuse private-sector talent 
and resources to support Afghan business 
development.
Policies, rules, and regulations
Support Afghan businesses with a more conducive 
regulatory and operating environment, particularly 
in the areas of tax, land, and trade policy.
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The Obama administration’s recent comments 
about extending NATO’s presence in Afghanistan 
until 2014 are a positive step towards stabilizing the 
business environment.105 Such statements should be 
coupled with a renewed commitment to economic, 
and particularly private sector, development. 
Meanwhile, the international community should be 
careful about balancing the need for a longer-term 
commitment with not becoming open-ended and 
making Afghan businesses even more dependent 
on foreign aid and outside actors than they already 
are. International efforts should place as much 
responsibility as possible in Afghan hands with 
support from outside experts with relevant expertise. 
VI. Conclusion
Based on our field research, we conclude that 
private-sector development is possible and vital to 
Afghanistan’s future. However, the international 
community must be thoughtful about how it 
attempts to enable progress. War should not be an 
excuse to resurrect flawed concepts—for instance, 
that centrally planned growth is necessary due to a 
chaotic environment or that, with enough money, 
donors can simply create a developed economy. 
A vibrant private sector must be built from the 
ground up, where government provides a basic level 
of security, removes as much unpredictability as 
possible, and provides a regulatory framework for 
success. 
Our recommendations build on common sense 
thinking from the field. Many are basic. Private-
sector development in Afghanistan requires 
recognition of its fundamental importance to 
Afghanistan’s future; a comprehensive strategy; 
leadership by a senior official who is overall 
responsible for disparate and sometimes competing 
programs; incorporation of private-sector talent, 
western and Afghan, to drive this process; 
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establishment of incentives and oversight geared 
to results; prioritization of a handful of sectors 
with the highest potential rewards, rather than 
attempts to do everything; an examination of the 
past decade’s successes and failures; and constant 
consideration of the Afghan entrepreneur at the 
grassroots who is trying to innovate and provide 
value to the Afghan economy and society. 
Private-sector development offers hope for 
Afghanistan’s future, but requires a long-term 
commitment with realistic expectations. A western 
official stated, “The main obstacle is time. You 
have generations that are uneducated. We are 
in a big hurry. We have aggressive goals for 
nation-building and are trying to implement a 
counterinsurgency strategy faster. But this process 
won’t happen in a hurry. Our lessons learned are 
helping though. With more control in the hands 
of Afghans and less [development] money in the 
future, we will probably see better results.”
Private-sector development is not a quick or easy 
solution to Afghanistan’s ills. Moreover, it requires 
a fundamental shift: Afghan entrepreneurs must be 
empowered to be the key drivers. Outsiders must 
accept an enabling role while remaining aware 
of their potential to create harmful distortions. 
Importantly, this effort requires smarter policy and 
the right people, not necessarily more money. 
With targeted help, Afghanistan can see real and 
sustainable growth in the next decade and beyond. 
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Appendix: 
Additional Observations
Some of the anecdotal observations gleaned in 
interviews did not fit well into a discussion of the 
major problems faced by SMEs in Afghanistan; 
however, they may still provide valuable context to 
some readers. 
Cultural Considerations
A number of cultural constraints to economic 
growth were mentioned often in interviews, 
though they should not be overly generalized. 
Many of these are symptoms of the lack of trust 
and survivor mentality developed by decades of 
war. Afghans often are wary of business partners 
and can be uncomfortable working together across 
ethnic lines. Carpet producers worry that rivals 
will steal their designs, and do not want to share 
cutting and finishing facilities with other producers. 
The formation of effective associations and lobbies 
to influence government policy is hindered by 
distrust. 
Both Afghans and internationals also raised 
concerns about quality issues. In attempts to 
compete in niche high-end exports—such as 
traditional arts and handicrafts—some Afghans 
have trouble understanding the competition level 
of the world market and that their product must 
be “perfect” to deserve the high price required by 
the exorbitant costs of distributing to a western 
market. “I have to constantly send back items 
to be redone,” a manager of one such business 
explained, “and I worry that when I am no longer 
here, the quality will fall and they will again lose 
their portion of the world market.”
Development officials further noted that Afghans 
often do not have an appreciation for the value 
of quality control measures or certification 
processes—and therefore lose out on international 
contracting opportunities that instead go to 
Pakistan. Quality concerns have resulted in a 
very poor brand for Afghan products—within 
Afghanistan itself. These concerns have prompted 
some Afghan manufacturers to hide the fact 
that their products are made in Afghanistan. For 
example, one Mazar-e-Sharif−based cable and wire 
manufacturer labeled his products “Made in Iran” 
to convey high quality to customers. He explained 
that many Afghans associated goods made in 
Afghanistan with shoddy quality. 
On the opposite end from high-end issues, several 
Afghan business owners noted that Afghans were 
too proud and disdained certain jobs as beneath 
them or “not worth their while.” They explained 
that when some Afghans saw a Pakistani doing a 
basic job, such as sanitation or menial labor, the 
Afghans then would refuse to be employed in the 
same way.
Advantages of a 
Developing Market 
Although the aforementioned problems that 
typical developing countries face seems to present 
a particularly gloomy picture of the opportunities 
in Afghanistan, its situation is not entirely negative 
for business. In some cases, the lack of competition 
and the Afghan people’s eagerness for a service 
of any quality can prove skeptics wrong. There is 
more consumer forgiveness in a developing market. 
For example, Tolo Television (a subsidiary of Moby 
Group) initially was able to buy old Bulgarian 
rather than western broadcasting equipment 
because viewers and advertisers could handle a 
few minutes off air or a bad signal. One of the 
first private television stations, Tolo TV eventually 
became profitable and is now the market leader in 
Afghanistan. 
Box of a Mazar-e-Sharif cable and wire company
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Another advantage of developing countries—the 
ability to leapfrog technologies—has spurred the 
telecom industry, the biggest business success 
story in Afghanistan. One of the oft-told success 
stories of Afghanistan is how Ashraf Ghani 
resisted calls to contract a company to provide cell 
phone service, but instead tendered licenses in a 
transparent way.106 Today, Afghanistan has nearly 
12 million mobile telephone customers, a market 
penetration of almost 50 percent—astounding for 
a country that had virtually no telecommunications 
infrastructure a decade ago. 
The Afghan market excuses even safety problems, 
for better or worse. One of Pamir Airline’s six 
aircraft crashed on a flight in May 2010 killing all 
aboard, the accident blamed on a combination of 
poor equipment and bad judgment. Yet through 
the summer, the majority of Pamir’s flights 
remained fully booked—and cheaper than the 
competition. 
Some entrepreneurs complained that outside 
consultants and donors tend to be risk averse 
and historically focused in their predictions, 
leading them to erroneously reject business ideas 
as unfeasible. But as one businessman told me, 
“They don’t realize that business in Afghanistan is 
all about scraping by on the margins, particularly 
at first. You pay your creditors late, get your 
customers to pay now, scrape by until you can 
reach daylight.”
Once success is achieved, expansion becomes 
easier because of a dearth of competition—
assuming the business does not attract the 
attention of a powerful government official or 
power broker. Michelle Morgan, contract director 
of USAID’s ASMED program, attributed the 
common phenomenon of vertical integration to 
a lack of entrepreneurs who were both talented 
and resourced—successful business people find no 
shortage of additional unfilled needs.
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